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EXCEPTIONS MEET ABSOLUTISM: OUTLAWING
GOVERNMENTAL UNDERREACH IN HEALTH LAW
CHRISTINA S. Hot
ABSTRACT
Health measures are sometimes struck, not for "overbreadth," but
for "underbreadth." Short of an equal protection problem, a guaranteed
right, an unconstitutional condition, or other constitutional problem, how
does the effort to moderate a law by carving out exceptions to accommo-
date important concerns necessarily doom the underlying legal provision
itself? Is there any pattern to the courts' use of relatively malleable ad-
ministrative law review doctrines to strike down health rules, not just
because of what they do, but ostensibly because of what they leave un-
done?
This Article tackles the underappreciated vulnerability of excep-
tions-based rules in health law. I look at three examples: New York
City's notorious Soda Portion Cap Rule that exempted refills; the FDA's
decision to allow age-restricted, over-the-counter (OTC) emergency con-
traception; and Pennsylvania's Medicaid rules providing eyeglasses, an
optional benefit, to beneficiaries with eye disease but not to those with
refraction error. Each case exhibits three common elements that charac-
terize how a rule's exceptions, deliberately tailored to prevent overreach,
can turn out to be the rule's Achilles' heel. The courts in each of these
cases insist upon an extra-legal policy absolutism that challenges not
only our assumptions of a default judicial posture favoring cost-benefit
analysis but also deeper assumptions about the rule-based nature of law.
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INTRODUCTION
Health law perches at an intersection where disciplines and values
collide. A longtime observer, in an article entitled Can Health Law Be-
come a Coherent Field ofLaw?, opens with the following declaration: "I
want to concede at the outset that health law, today, is not yet a coherent
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field of law. It is, rather, a disjointed set of statutes and doctrines
based on different principles and paradigms ....
Major health laws, from Medicare to the recent Affordable Care
Act, are products of intense normative struggle.2 The results are often
highly detailed statutory and regulatory regimes memorializing each
round of combat over enactment and implementation. These regimes are
inevitably littered with rules containing built-in exceptions.
In this Article, I will show that this design, employed extensively
throughout the health law field, is vulnerable in court. This Article iden-
tifies a phenomenon of judicial antagonism towards rules with built-in
exceptions. This phenomenon exhibits a pattern, which spans the politi-
cal spectrum, whereby judges intervene to strike such health-related rules
precisely because the exceptions signal value conflict. Next under the
pattern, judges divert the underlying disputes to extra-legal arenas of
decision-making, such as politics, science, or medicine. Finally, they
justify their intervention using distinctly rule-averse forms of reasoning
derived from the self-same, extra-legal arenas that they anointed as the
appropriate normative fora. The existence of this three-part judicial sub-
routine challenges some of our assumptions about the judicial default
posture favoring cost-benefit analysis, as well as deeper assumptions
about the rule-based nature of law.4
My thesis starts from the feature of exceptions built into a rule be-
5fore the time of application. I acknowledge that the parameters of a
rule's applicability are sometimes framed linguistically as an exception
and sometimes as one of the rule's conditions, requirements, or "ele-
ments."6 I will refer to both as exceptions, stipulating that the phenome-
non I am describing is a rule's "underinclusion," regardless of how it
appears as an artifact of language.
I. Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 365, 365 (2006).
2. For the ACA's accommodation of multiple different goals and ideas, see, for example,
Paul Krugman, The Big Kludge, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 2013, at A27 (describing the ACA as "a clum-
sy, ugly structure that more or less deals with a problem"); see also Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing,
NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/12/14/testing-testing-2
(comparing the strategy of the ACA on health cost rationalization to agricultural policy at the turn of
the twentieth century, not "a grand solution[,]" but "a hodgepodge").
3. The Supreme Court has declared ERISA "a 'comprehensive and reticulated statute[.]"'
Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993)). For the proposition that Medicare is filled with detailed, highly
specified provisions, see Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn't
Worked, 101 GEo. L.J. 519, 524 (2013).
4. For the default posture of cost-benefit analysis, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default
Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1667-68 (2001). For the rule-based nature of law according to
legal positivism, see infra notes 7, 19 & 23.
5. This is in contrast to those exceptions that result from rule defeasibility.
6. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 872-73 (1991). But see
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 533-36 (1983) (differentiating
between jurisdictional parameters that define a statute's applicability and proscriptive parameters
that define the conduct to be prohibited).
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Why should judges invalidate rules narrowly drawn to fit diverse
considerations?7 What account can we give for why judges limit law-
makers to a seemingly all-or-nothing range of action with no ability to
trim a measure to accommodate different factors? My discussion of three
illustrative health law cases will show that doctrine alone cannot answer
these questions.
In seeking the unstated fit norms that rein in exceptions, I examine
these cases and find that these judges disfavor rules in the face of the
value conflict that is inevitable given the normative pluralism character-
8izing health law. Exceptions are often indicators of a highly salient val-
ue conflict,9 and the examples show that judges are hesitant to depend
7. Throughout this Article, I will use "rule" in the thin, abstract sense, as a norm character-
ized by a certain degree of detailed specificity, and which applies pressure to conform where the
reason for conforming is the fact of the rule itself. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 21, 55-57
(1961). T will refer to such a norm as a "rule" whether it is in fact an agency "regulation," technically
an "order" under the Administrative Procedure Act, a statutory or constitutional provision, or judge-
made doctrine. This Article focuses on "rules" made at the agency level, but we observe such pat-
terns in regimes that impose substantive review on legislation as well. See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (declaring the ACA's individ-
ual mandate outside Congress's authority in part because of the exceptions carved out of the man-
date), af'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001) (invalidating ban on
indoor tobacco advertising near schools if placed less than five feet from the ground, citing failure to
protect children taller than five feet); Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 411, 416-17 (Idaho
1976) (explaining that a state malpractice damages cap might be constitutional under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but that the cap violated the state constitution in part
because it did not cap liability for other types of defendants). But see Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (declaring that "the reform may take one step at a time, ad-
dressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute . . . . The legislature may select
one phase of one field and apply a remedy there"). For articles that document similar "exceptions" or
all-or-nothing phenomena in non-health constitutional law fields, see Mitchell N. Berman, Commer-
cial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes
the Lesser," 55 VAND. L. REv. 693 (2002); John Fee, Greater-or-Nothing Constitutional Rules, 64
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 101 (2013); Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument hat the
Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227 (1994); Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of
First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based
Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 32.
8. These cases are not meant to be representative, but they are also not isolated examples of
this phenomenon of invalidation for underinclusion. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobac-
co Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133-36 (2000) (ruling that the regulation of cigarettes as a drug-delivery
device is outside the statutory authorization because FDA only banned marketing to minors when
such an unsafe product should have been banned entirely); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779-82 (2014) (striking HHS regulation mandating for employer provision of
contraceptive coverage as part of the ACA requirement that employers provide preventative care as
contrary to the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act in part because carve outs from that mandate
for grandfathered plans and for non-profits suggested a less restrictive alternative); Am. Trucking
Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating the 0.08 ppm ozone standard
because the underlying statutory delegation, by prohibiting cost-benefit analysis with respect to
public health, provided "no intelligible principle" for standard setting short of complete elimination),
af'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
9. Many scholars discuss this feature of exceptions, limitations, balancing, and under-
inclusion. See, e.g., Claire Oakes Finkelstein, When the Rule Swallows the Exception, in Rules and
Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer 147-49 (Linda Meyer ed., 1999), reprinted in 19
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 505, 505-08 (2000); see also John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013
Term-Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4 (2014) (stating of
the Court's fidelity to accommodations in Congressional text that "[b]y adhering, instead, to the
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upon "rules" in these contexts-whether the rules are regulatory or
judge-made, substantive or "jurisdictional." The reasons they give fit a
pattern, suggesting that courts are eliding rules with their underlying
justifications.'o This phenomenon amounts to a policy-absolutist counter-
strand to the implicit cost-benefit default principles that Cass Sunstein
has identified, which purport to give agencies latitude to weigh compet-
11
ing concerns.
A. Conventional Wisdom: Courts Employ Cost-Benefit Defaults
Sunstein has argued for an emerging "federal common law of regu-
latory policy" consisting of presumptions that federal courts, particularly
the D.C. Circuit, employ to construe statutes in such a way as to allow
agencies to accommodate countervailing costs and benefits.12 Sunstein
examines the case law to show that, absent clear congressional prohibi-
tion, agencies are by default permitted under a variety of statutory au-
thorizations to make de minimis exceptions; to consider health-health
tradeoffs; to weigh costs as well as benefits; and to reject nonfeasible
regulation.13 Indeed, he argues that at least some of these cost-benefit
defaults, by placing a clear-statement burden on Congress when it pre-
scribes "policy absolutism" to the exclusion of offsetting concerns, are
part of an arsenal of nondelegation canons that limit unconfined agency
action and thereby protect the values of Article I, Section I of the Consti-
tution.14 Thus, Sunstein's cost-benefit default principles reflect the judi-
cial stance that rules are less arbitrary and more legitimate when they do
acknowledge competing considerations.5
While Sunstein restricts his gaze to federal courts reviewing federal
agency action, cost-benefit analysis is also prevalent, potentially even
words of the statute as written, today's Court enables Congress more predictably to express its
preference for outcomes that may not be so coherent - that include rough accommodations, take
only baby steps toward some broader purpose, or adopt crisp rules that favor certainty over achiev-
ing a perfect means-ends fit"); Linda Ross Meyer, Unruly Rights, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 1-9
(2000) (discussing the significance of balancing and limitation in the context of "interest" based
theories of rights); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing
Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 773-75 (1995).
10. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 3-6 (1977) (discussing the
perennial jurisprudential question of whether law consists of rules or whether law consists in part of
the underlying moral principles behind those rules).
11. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1667-68. 1 am not proposing these exceptions are precisely
contoured for nor governed by utilitarian welfare calculations, but they do exhibit a kind of balanc-
ing, or trade-off orientation. And Sunstein's orientation toward trade-offs or accommodations re-
flects this broader perspective rather than a narrower utilitarianism. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1733, 1739-41 (1995).
12. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1654-56.
13. Id at 1668-70.
14. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 323, 334-35
nn.93-94 (2000).
15. See Sunstein, supra note II (advancing a view that law allows people in a society to
proceed without forcing convergence or coherence on larger abstract values and principles).
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normatively privileged, in states as well.1 6 Yet in the three health law
cases I examine, instead of following a common law that favors account-
ing for offsetting values, courts seem to be striking those rules that
acknowledge competing considerations.'7 Such a view, if extended,
would render rules unsuited to the management of plural values.
B. Contrasting Pattern
My approach in this project is to look at three cases, spanning both
time and the political spectrum. These cases involve New York City's
Soda Portion Cap Rule, the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's)
decision to allow age-restricted, over-the-counter status for emergency
contraception, and Pennsylvania's Medicaid rule that provided eyeglass-
es to those with eye disease but not refraction error. In each case, the rule
is struck because it contains a built-in exception. I identify the common-
alities that underlie the decisions across three doctrinal areas, namely, the
New York State separation of powers doctrine, the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, and
statutory interpretation of the federal Medicaid statute's "reasonable-
ness" standard for state programs.
Three common elements emerge from the three examples:
1) First, the court in each instance identifies the exception-laden
provision's ambition to confront value conflict as the crucial misstep that
dooms the measure. The design of the soda portion cap balanced health
against "economic" as well as political turf or even liberty considera-
tions. The Plan B age-restricted switch decision balanced legitimate
"safety and efficacy" considerations against sexual morality. Pennsylva-
nia balanced health needs against cost considerations.
2) Next, each judge, having decided that the rule improperly han-
dled value conflicts, assigned the decision to some extra-legal arena-
politics in the soda portion cap, science in the Plan B OTC switch, and
clinical medicine in the Pennsylvania eyeglasses benefits. The judge dis-
abled positive law in each of these cases, preferring the governance of
other, arguably more robust social institutions instead.
16. Indeed in the New York state case I examine here, Judge Pigott declares, "[C]ost-benefit
analysis is the essence of reasonable regulation; if an agency adopted a particular rule without first
considering whether its benefits justify its societal costs, it would be acting irrationally." N.Y.
Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene,
16 N.E.3d 538, 546 (N.Y. 2014). And the dissent states, "Cost-benefit analysis has long been a
staple of state and federal regulatory processes (see e.g.[,] State Administrative Procedure Act
§ 202-a [1] ['In developing a rule, an agency shall, to the extent consistent with the objectives of
applicable statutes, consider utilizing approaches which are designed to avoid undue deleterious
economic effects or overly burdensome impacts of the rule upon persons']." Id at 559 n.3 (Read, J.,
dissenting) (second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 202-a(l)
(McKinney 2015)).
17. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the
Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 753, 755-58 (2013) (arguing that canons of statutory
interpretation are a form federal common law).
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3) Third, despite the ostensible deference of the judge to these other
justificatory arenas, the judge in each case determines the outcome her-
self in the guise of a decision to divert jurisdiction over the matter away
from the agency to her favored arena.'8 However, the judge never articu-
lates a jurisdictional rule. Instead, the judge decides the jurisdictional
question by applying her own conception of the methodology borrowed
from the non-legal institution she has predetermined. The dispositive
analysis was balancing in the soda portion cap case, extrapolation to an
undersampled population in the emergency contraception OTC case, and
reference to ophthalmologist affidavits in the Medicaid eyeglasses case.
This three-step maneuver is profoundly rule averse. Steps one and
two are common enough insofar as legal institutions often sidestep the
declaration of substantive rules and use jurisdictional rules instead to
assign the substantive decision to another actor. However, step three in
these cases shows that the jurisdictional decision is also decided by re-
course to rule-averse reasoning.
I begin by examining the scholarship on the nature of rules and their
justifications to discover what in our expectations surrounding rules
might prompt resistance to exceptions.
I. RULES, COMPOUND JUSTIFICATIONS, AND EXTERNAL EXCEPTIONS
A. Legal Scholarship and Definitional Matters
Much has been written of exceptions, but mostly to identify the cir-
cumstances under which exceptions should be, or are likely to be, craft-
ed.19 The exceptions literature does not speak to the question of why,
once a rule has been agreed upon through a process granted social au-
thority, it should then be struck, especially when one of positive law's
uses is held to be "the authoritative settlement of moral and political is-
sues."20
B. Exceptions as a Superficial Category or as Underinclusion?
Above, I note that when I speak of exceptions, I am referring to ex
ante exceptions written into the rule at its inception. Of course, as Freder-
ick Schauer points out, an exception is hard to distinguish from any other
18. 1 use the term "jurisdiction" here not in the technical sense, but to refer to the substantive
arena governing decision-making.
19. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Admin-
istrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 280 (1982); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision ofAdminis-
trative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 74-75 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 588-90 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the
Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process,
1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 167 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 957-
58 (1995).
20. Scott J. Shapiro, The "Hart-Dworkin" Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in
RONALD DWORKIN 22,24 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
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qualifying parameter set forth in the rule.21 Thus, condemnation of a rule
for having an exception is hard to distinguish from condemnation of any
other aspect of the rule's scope or content. However, Claire Oakes
Finkelstein shows that some exceptions or carve-outs can be identified
with significance beyond linguistic fortuity or stylistic choice.22 She sug-
gests that certain exceptions are usefully thought of as external to the rule
that they condition23 : "An exception is a qualification of a rule that
stands in a certain relation to it, namely it stands outside the rule it quali-
fies."24 In her account, an exception's "outsider" status obtains if the
exception can be said to have a different "justification" from that which
underlies the rule.2 5 She even ascribes this view to Schauer himself6:
"The logic of exceptions . . . is more correctly understood in terms of
what Schauer calls 'external' failure, namely conflict between a rule and
something other than the rule's own background justification." 27
C. Rules as Distinct from Justifications
Schauer also supplies the notions of underinclusion and compound
justifications to help us specify the relationship of rules to exceptions. In
his rigorously considered account of "rule-ness," Schauer tells us that a
rule, by definition, diverges from its justification, and he explores the
phenomena of underinclusion and overinclusion of rules relative to their
justifications.28 With these resources in hand, I contend that the type of
ex ante exceptions I examine here can be understood as underinclusions
relative to some justification.
Schauer tells us that for a rule to be a rule, it must apply some pres-
sure distinct from what the justification would suggest if one were to rely
directly on the justification to make decisions:
If a rule applies even when its application would not serve the rule's
justification, and if a rule does not apply even when application
21. Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 152-53 (describing Schauer's position on this point).
22. Id. at 149.
23. Id. at 149, 155 (conceding that Schauer recognizes external exceptions too).
24. Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted).
25. Id. at 155.
26. Id. (distinguishing internal and external exceptions).
27. Id.; see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 117-18 (1991) ("By compari-
son, rules with some resistance to internal failure . .. might still be subject to being overridden by
particularly exigent factors external both to the rule and its justification. When rules are inapplicable
(or, more accurately, non-controlling) on the basis of such factors not themselves a function of what
this rule itself is designed to accomplish, we can say that such rules are externally defeasible, subject
to being defeated or rendered non-controlling by factors external to the rule itself."). Of course,
under a single-valued justificatory system, like utilitarianism, this distinction collapses, as he points
out. Schauer goes on to explain that rules should exert some resistance to external defeasibility:
"[F]or a rule to be a reason for action" it must have "weight." SCHAUER, supra, at 118.
28. See SCHAUER, supra note 27, at 61-62; see also id. at 76 ("A rule exists ... insofar as an
instantiation of a justification is treated . . . as entrenched, having the power to provide a reason for
decision even when that instantiation does not serve its generating justification. The form of deci-
sion-making that we can call rule-based, therefore, exists insofar as instantiations resist efforts to
penetrate them in the service of their justifications.").
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would serve that justification, is it a bad rule? Or have we just misap-
plied the rule? Or is this just part of what rules are all about?29
Rules and justifications will inevitably diverge due in large part to
the unavoidable generality of the rule. However, if one could anticipate
the particular cases where the rule would prove overinclusive, or more to
our purposes, underinclusive, one could then articulate and build in ex-
ceptions in advance.30
One reason that a rule's fit might be predictably bad is based on "in-
ternal" reasons, namely, where the rule does not fit the justification be-
cause the justification itself is undermined by the rule. An example
would be what Sunstein calls "health-health trade-off~s]" when one of
the justifications for the rule is health promotion, yet the health-
promoting measure may itself have adverse side effects for health, justi-
fying limitation of the rule based on "health" concerns as well.' Sunstein
gives a hypothetical example where "the regulation of one risk, like ...
asbestos, may give rise to further risks as a result of the substituted prod-
ucts[,]" which may be just as harmful.32 An "external" failure of the rule,
by contrast, would arise where a different countervailing justification,
e.g., a non-health reason such as economic cost, could be known in ad-
vance to exceed what we would consider justified by the health gains
from regulating asbestos.33 For example, we might find the countervail-
ing cost justification convincing for some subset of instances, such as in
small businesses with ten or fewer employees.
D. Plural Justifications
Thus, characterizing a failure of fit as "internal" or "external" to a
rule, indeed framing the notion of fit at all, or even understanding wheth-
er a rule is even a rule, all depend on each rule having an identifiable
"justification." Yet justifications are often plural. The phenomenon of
compound justifications for any one rule has been noted in other con-
texts, including statutory interpretation, and with respect to rationality
review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.34 "If legis-
lation is often a rough-hewn compromise, then testing its validity against
'actual' legislative purpose risks attributing unwarranted coherence to the
legislative process, which may entail logrolling or other strategic voting,
29. Id. at 34. For a thorough consideration of the role of rules in various health-related deci-
sions, using Schauer's account of rules, see DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH:
MAKING MORAL THEORY WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 11-15 (2001).
30. SCHAUER, supra note 27, at 36-37.
31. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE 124 (2002).
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123,
132 (1972) (criticizing the handling of cases under the rational review doctrine for formulating the
purpose against which the statutory means would be measured for rationality as "a unit rather than as
a mix of policies").
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making concessions to strongly felt but outlying interests, or papering
over disagreements to ensure the legislation's passage."35
In sum, justifications associated with a particular rule can be multi-
farious. Often, the limiting boundary narrowing the scope of the rule is
justified by "external" values, or concerns that differ from the value or
policy underlying the rule. To the extent he rule contains such narrowing
parameters, one could say that the parameters render the rule "underin-
clusive" relative to that particular animating justification. In other words,
even if the narrower rule better fits the constellation of justifications that
might impinge in particular situations, it does not realize the single pre-
sumed animating value to the fullest extent possible because of a limiting
parameter or "carve-out."
Schauer tells us that the nature of rule-based practice is to recognize
that a rule presumptively governs, even when the rule-generated outcome
is not congruent with the resolution of the situation were it to be decided
by resort to the animating justification.36 Thus, if such a narrowed rule
(or exception) is applied, even when the animating justification might
argue for fuller application, that is because in our system of law, we rec-
ognize the normative force of rules, rather than reverting in every in-
stance to decision by justification. 37
Yet as we will see, exceptions, if they arise from competing values
limiting a rule, are sometimes not given effect. These are the examples
we turn to next.
35. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2387, 2450 (2003) (foot-
note omitted). See also Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 540-41 ("Almost all statutes are compromises .
. . . What matters to the balancers is reducing the chance that their work will be invoked subsequent-
ly to achieve more, or less, than they intended, thereby upsetting the balance of the package....
Legislators seeking only to further the public interest may conclude that the provision of public rules
should reach so far and no farther.. .. No matter how good the end in view, achievement of the end
will have some cost, and at some point the cost will begin to exceed the benefits."); Note, supra note
34, at 131-32 (citing John Hart Ely's suggestion that courts must be "restrict[ing] the range of ac-
ceptable goals"). The Note author then goes on to state that to strike a rule for underinclusion denies
multiple justifications. If multiple justifications define the rules' contours, many rules may be "'tau-
tologically' rational," unless the court privileges some of the justifications. Id.
36. SCHAUER, supra note 27, at 93-100.
37. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMs (1990) (providing an ac-
count of rules as norms that substitute for the underlying justification). The project of this Article is
to probe that assumption that our system of law is rule-based, rather than infused with what exclu-
sive positivists would deem "extra-legal" elements. C.f, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699
(2001) (demonstrating that natural law elements enter into judicial decisionmaking, where the court
cites the maxim "[c]essante ratione legis cessat ipse lex" meaning that where a law's rationale ceases
to apply, so does the law itself (quoting I EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 70b (1628))). In Zavydas, the
Supreme Court granted habeas relief even though the statute set no limit on the length of time for
detention beyond removal and "the applicability of due process to aliens subject to removal is at
least questionable." Michael W. McConnell, The Ninth Amendment in Light of Text and History,




A. NY Statewide Coalition v. NYC Health Department: Soda Portion
Cap Rule
1. Description
In May of 2012, then-mayor of New York City, Michael Bloom-
berg, publicly proposed to cap the containers that Food Service Estab-
lishments (FSEs) use to sell sugary drinks at sixteen ounces.38 The provi-
sion defined a "sugary drink" as a nonalcoholic beverage sweetened with
sugar or another caloric sweetener, with more than twenty-five calories
per eight fluid ounces of beverage, and with milk or milk-substitute in-
gredients constituting fifty percent or less of the beverage by volume.39
On June 9, the City published a notice of public hearing to be held
by the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
(DOHMH) in late July. 40 Afterwards, DOHMH sent a memo to its rule-
making arm, the City's Board of Health (BOH), summarizing the hear-
41
ing.
Shortly thereafter, on September 13, the BOH, composed of eleven
members appointed by the mayor, passed New York City Health Code
§ 81.53 establishing the Soda Portion Cap Rule.42
Under the City Charter, the DOHMH has jurisdiction to regulate all
"matters affecting health in the City, including conditions hazardous to
life and health, by, among other things, regulating the food and drug
supply of the City, and enforcing provisions of the New York City
Health Code."4 3 The BOH is charged with establishing the code of health
with respect to anything within the DOHMH's jurisdiction."
The soda portion cap measure met opposition throughout the pro-
cess. Two days after it was announced, a group of city council members
wrote to the mayor, objecting and demanding a council vote.45 One
month after it was adopted, a coalition of plaintiffs sued the DOHMH in
state court over the rule." The county court, in an opinion by Judge Tin-
gling, invalidated the rule as both "arbitrary and capricious" and as im-
proper "legislation" by an administrative entity in violation of the state
38. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide II), 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
39. N.Y.C., N. Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53 (2012) (repealed 2013).
40. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
41. Id.
42. Id at 204-05.
43. Id. at 204.
44. N.Y.C. CHARTER §§ 553, 558 (2009).
45. New York Statewide ll, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
46. Id. at 206.
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constitutional separation of powers test laid out in a prior case,47 Boreali
v. Axelrod.4 8 This outcome was upheld on appeal by Judge Renwick,
relying upon the separation of powers' grounds for invalidation and,
therefore, declining to reach the issue of the rule's arbitrariness.49 The
highest court in New York then affirmed the intermediate appellate court
decision 4-3 on June 26, 2014, with a majority opinion by Judge Pigott
and dissent by Judge Read.o
2. Exceptions
The Soda Portion Cap Rule was characterized as riddled with ex-
ceptions. These exceptions were then blamed as the telltale sign that the
health department improperly balanced political considerations, thus
violating one of the four prongs of the Boreali test for forbidden legisla-
tion by an executive agency.
Judge Renwick describes the rule as follows: "The rule thus target-
ed non-diet soft drinks . . . but contained carve-outs for alcoholic bever-
ages, milkshakes, fruit smoothies and mixed coffee drinks, mochas, lat-
tes, and 100% fruit juices."
These exclusions arose from the definition of "sugary drink."52 The
definition stipulates that a sugary drink is "non-alcoholic."53 It also de-
fines "sugary drinks" as "sweetened by the manufacturer or establish-
ment," thus excluding 100% fruit juices.54 The caloric threshold and
stipulation of "caloric sweetener" presumably exclude diet soft drinks.
Finally, the definition excludes drinks that are constituted by more than
fifty percent milk or milk substitute.56 This parameter thus exempts some
lattes, smoothies, mixed coffee drinks, and milkshakes.
Furthermore, because the Soda Portion Cap Rule stated that it ap-
plies to "food service establishments," whose scope is elsewhere de-
fined,57 the petitioners challenging the rule complained that the rule
47. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide l), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *7-8, *19-20 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
48. Boreali v. Axelrod, 518 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443-45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (striking the New
York Public Health Commission's indoor smoking ban as improper legislation by a state agency).
49. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
50. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide III), 16 N.E.3d 538, 540, 549-50 (N.Y. 2014).
51. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
52. N.Y.C., N. Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2012) (repealed 2013).
53. Id. § 81.53(a)(1)(A).
54. Id. § 81.53(a)(1)(B).
55. Id
56. Id. § 81.53(a)(1)(D).
57. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide II), 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (quoting
the code's definition of a "food service establishment" (FSE) as "a place where food is provided for
individual portion service directly to the consumer whether such food is provided free of charge or
sold, whether consumption occurs on or off the premises or is provided from a pushcart, stand or
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"would appear to exempt grocery stores, convenience stores, bodegas
and markets from having to comply with the Rule. . . . [Such exempt
establishments would] includ[e] the 7-11 market chains and their famous,
or infamous, Big Gulp containers ... ."58
Finally, because the rule regulates size, but not number, of portions,
the petitioners could characterize refills as an exception and persuade
New York's highest court that the entire approach of capping portion
size was underinclusive. 5
3. Boreali Test
The principal complaint that emerges in the suit is that the health
department, as an executive agency, has engaged in an act of impermis-
sible "legislation." Petitioners contend that under the New York State
Constitution, agencies like the BOH "may not bypass the legislature,
under the guise of public health, and make fundamental policy choices
and establish far-reaching new policy programs all by themselves, no
matter how well-intentioned they may be."a How does the presence of
exceptions pertain to whether the Soda Portion Cap Rule constitutes im-
proper "legislation," violating state separation of powers doctrine? The
answer is that Boreali, the seminal case defining the test for such a doc-
trine, contains a prong designating exceptions as a sign of such improper
legislating.6 1
The Boreali test identifies four prongs, the first of which speaks
most directly to the issue of exceptions. The first prong looks at "whether
the challenged regulation is based upon concerns not related to the stated
purpose of the regulation, i.e., is the regulation based on other factors
such as economic, political or social concerns?"62 In other words, "The
first factor in Boreali probes whether the challenged regulation carves
out exemptions based on economic, political and social considerations."63
vehicle" (quoting N.Y.C., N.Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.03(s))). The definition of FSEs also
"excludes food processing establishments, retail food stores, private homes ... and food service
operations where a distinct group mutually provides .. . and consumes the food." N.Y. Statewide
Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene (New York
Statewide I), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013). According "to
[the] 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) . .. [with] the State's Department of Agriculture
and Markets, an FSE is subject to inspection by a local health department only if it generates 50% or
more of its total annual dollar receipts from the sale of food for consumption on the premises or
ready-to-eat for off-premises consumption." New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
58. New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8.
59. See id; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C.
Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide il), 16 N.E.3d 538, 547 (N.Y. 2014).
60. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 206 (quoting Petition, New York Statewide I, No.
653584/12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 11, 2012), 2013 WL 1343607).
61. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1355 (N.Y. 1987).
62. New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8.
63. Id (emphasis added).
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The second prong asks whether the agency filled in the "interstitial"
details of "legislation describing the over-all policies to be implemented"
or if it "wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of
rules without [the] benefit of legislative guidance."6" The third prong
inquires, "[D]id the regulation intrude upon ongoing legislative debate?
In other words, did the regulation address a matter the legislature has
discussed, debated or tried to address prior to this regulation?"65 And
finally, the fourth prong weighs whether "the regulation require[d] the
exercise of expertise or technical competence on behalf of the body pass-
ing the legislation."6
Thus, if an agency engages in line drawing to pursue public health
without excessive economic cost, the first Boreali prong would tend to
characterize the agency's action as legislative because such a measure
aims "to resolve difficult social problems by making choices among
competing ends."67
The Boreali court, in striking a state public health regulation on in-
door smoking, noted:
The exemptions . . . carved out for bars, convention cen-
ters, small restaurants . . . as well as the . . . 'waivers'
based on financial hardship, have no foundation in con-
siderations of public health. Rather, they demonstrate
the agency's own effort to weigh the goal of promoting
health against its social cost and to reach a suitable com-
*68promise.
Boreali declares that exemptions are a sign that this compromise is
occurring because, precisely as Finkelstein argued, exemptions typically
"run counter to such goals and, consequently, cannot be justified as sim-
ple implementations of legislative values."69
Even as the Boreali framework assumes that exceptions are "exter-
nal," presupposing a justificatory value apart from and competing with
the value embodied in the rule, the city health organs tried to argue that
the soda portion cap's exceptions were "internal" and "based solely on
health-related concerns."70 While this argument does not account for all
the exemptions,' the health agencies explained that the exceptions for
milk or juice were justified insofar as each of these items have some nu-
64. Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1356.
65. New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8.
66. Id.
67. Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1356.
68. Id. at 1355.
69. Id.
70. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
71. For instance, alcohol or convenience store Big Gulp drinks were exempted because other
executive agencies had claims of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Katherine Pratt, The Limits ofAnti-Obesity
Public Health Paternalism: Another View, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1903, 1921, 1928 (2014).
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tritional value.72 However, Judge Renwick remained unconvinced be-
cause she regarded the entire design of the provision as underinclusive:
the rule, she observed, in manipulating portion size, does not ban sugary
drinks entirely.73 She said it instead "relies upon the behavioral econom-
ics concept that consumers are pushed into better behavior when certain
choices are made less convenient."74
Remarkably, for Renwick and Pigott, it is this regulatory modesty
which proves that the agency was balancing, not just considering health:
"By restricting portions, the Board necessarily chose between ends, in-
cluding public health, the economic consequences associated with re-
stricting profits by beverage companies and vendors . . . and personal
,,75autonomy ....
The courts also found it damning that the health department framed
the obesity toll in economic terms. The health department had observed
that "[o]besity related health care expenditures in New York City now
exceed $4.7 billion annually . .. Medicare and Medicaid programs fund-
ed by tax dollars, pay approximately 60 per cent [sic] of those costs."76
This economic quantification spurred the court to say that the city was
inappropriately considering economic counterweights to health con-
77cerns.
The health agency also accommodated the jurisdiction of the New
York State Department of Agriculture and Markets by avoiding direct
regulation of grocery stores, which are otherwise under their sister agen-
cy's inspection purview. To Tingling, though, "[t]his could be construed
as evidencing political considerations outside of the Statement of Basis
and Purpose."78 The vision that the judges furnish for proper agency be-
havior is quite puzzling. If agencies were to disregard jurisdiction, politi-
cal considerations, economic costs, and all other ends, that tunnel vision
would seem itself to pose threats in the form of agency overreach.79
4. Value Conflict
The Soda Portion Cap exceptions thus signify the resolution of con-
flicting purposes and prompt judicial invalidation of the rule.
72. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide III), 16 N.E.3d 538, 547 (N.Y. 2014); see also New York
Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
76. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide 1), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. I1, 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y.C. Health Commissioner Farley).
77. Id. at *9.
78. Id. at *8; see also New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
79. See Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of
Woodrow Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1898-99 (2013).
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The formulation of the Boreali prong illustrates that the way the
rule confronts value conflict is one, if not the decisive issue in the case.
But we also find support in the fact that the battle was joined precisely at
the issue of whether the exception was "internal," serving other health
needs, rather than a reflection of some external purpose.80 With an inter-
nal justification, the value conflict dissolves to a mere question of which
means one should use to pursue the unitary value of health. That judges
in each of these cases refuse to recognize the exceptions as "internal"
signals there is something more going on in these cases apart from the
means-ends analysis associated with the ordinary fit tests of substantive
review for rationality.
Instead, the courts seem wedded to showing that the exceptions are
external and that each rule, despite its alignment with the constellation of
ends that it is navigating, is "unfit." The courts are therefore positing a
single, unalloyed justification for the rule. They then proceed to vigor-
ously interrogate "fit" relative to the rule's posited justification. In this
case, the court derived the requirement that health serves as the sole jus-
tification for BOH action from the state's constitutional separation of
powers doctrine. What is curious about he unitary justification approach
is that if it prevails, any standard setting is doomed, not just the delinea-
tion of a standard's scope through exceptions.8 1 It simply fails the plausi-
bility test to pretend that standard setting can avoid settling among com-
peting ends.
Furthermore, the courts' insistence upon rationalization of every as-
pect of the rule to its one recognized justification seems to run counter to
the very function of a rule. As Schauer clarifies, the nature of a rule is
applicability even at the point where the justification would not fit.82
Thus, the rule applied in some instances will not match the rule's justifi-
cation. Even Ronald Dworkin, who includes background justifications
along with rules as part of the corpus of law, distinguishes "rules," which
have all-or-nothing force, from their supporting principles and policies,
which merely exert "weight."83 Of principles, he says, "When principles
intersect . . . one who must resolve the conflict has to take into account
,,84the relative weight of each. However, "[i]f the facts a rule stipulates
are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it sup-
plies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to
80. See supra text accompanying note 71.
81. See, e.g., Rick Hills, Why Did Bloomberg's Soda Portion Ban Bite the Dust? Was it
Mayoral Imperialism, Judicial Activism, or Both?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 11, 2013, 8:23 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/03/bloombergs-soda-portion-ban-bites-the-dust-
defeat-for-an-imperial-mayor-or-victory-for-activist-judg.html ("Is Justice Tingling really demand-
ing that agencies jettison consideration of cost, administrative feasibility, personal privacy, or finan-
cial feasibility when they pursue their primary mandate?").
82. SCHAUER, supra note 27, at 75-76.
83. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 22-28, 71-80.
84. Id. at 26.
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the decision."8  Thus Dworkin, like Schauer, believes that rules apply
even when an underlying principle runs out, or conversely, that the rule
may stop short of an underlying principle, including in those situations
when the rule accommodates a competing principle.
That the soda portion cap's fatal flaw was its attempt to perform this
very function of resolving value conflict by fiat is also paradoxically
evident in that the argument against the rule was framed as a lack of lim-
iting principle. On June 4, 2013, when the appellate court heard oral ar-
guments, the judge repeatedly queried the scope of the Board's jurisdic-
tion and asked whether there was any principle limiting the Board's ju-
risdiction.87 This argument is ironic because, in fact, the health agency
was trying to limit its jurisdiction and promote health while not over-
reaching. It was steering clear of other social and cultural practices while
respecting the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that divided in-
spection and oversight between health and agriculture agencies. Why
was the soda portion rule's limitation, ostensibly condemned as underin-
clusive relative to its health objectives, then viewed as an indication that
its scope of purpose was too broad and lacking a "limiting principle?"
Perhaps the key word is "principle." The judiciary demands that jurisdic-
tion should not be limited or designated ad hoc, or even by ex ante deci-
sion rule, but by background principle.
Here, the argument of underinclusion is turned on its head. And we
see the germ of the court's conception of rules, namely, its elision of
rules and principles, which leads it to reject these particular measures.
5. Assign to Non-Legal Sphere
Having invalidated rule-based line drawing, the courts' next ma-
neuver is to assign the decision to another decision-making sphere. In the
85. Id. at 24.
86. Id. at 26-27; see also id. at 77 ("[T]hese rules have a different shape than they would have
had if the principle [that no man may profit from his wrongs] had not been given any weight in the
decision at all. The long length of time generally required for acquiring title by adverse possession
might have been much shorter, for example, had this not been thought to conflict with the principle.
Indeed, one of my reasons for drawing the distinction between rules and principles was just to show
how rules often represent a kind of compromise amongst competing principles in this way . . . .");
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 180-84 (1986) (expressing Dworkin's views on compromise).
Thus, Dworkin would recognize exceptions as binding even if they embodied a principle competing
with the one underlying other parts of the rule; it would be binding because the exception would be
part of the rule itself.
87. See Glenn Blain, New York City's Soda Ban Bubbles Up to the State's Highest Court -
Updated, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jun. 4, 2014, 5:04 PM),
www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/new-york-city-soda-ban-bubbles-state-highest-court-
blog-entry- 1. 1817197.
88. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 73 (responding to Joseph Raz, of occasions for such
elision "[b]ut I did not deny, in my original article, that conflicts in rules might exist. I said that in
our legal system such conflicts would be occasions of emergency, occasions requiring a decision that
would alter the set of standards in some dramatic way. . . . [H]e may amend one or both of them to




opinions striking the Soda Portion Cap Rule, the courts' eagerness to
offload this decision to another decision-making mode is not matched by
clarity about what that mode might be.89 The judges assume, rather than
argue, that because the agency was improperly legislating, the politically
accountable legislature should have been the appropriate arena. Howev-
er, this assumption is perhaps too hasty on their part.
The prongs of the Boreali separation of powers test presuppose
"politics" or the legislature as the mode of decision-making illegitimately
displaced by the agency rule, and by extension, the default arena to
which this decision would revert. After all, the court introduces the test
as the means to judge whether the agency has "impermissibly trespassed
on legislative jurisdiction."" Moreover, the test's second prong probing
for "interstitial" gap filling or writing on "a clean slate" elevates the
guiding instructions of the legislature as dispositive.9 1 The third prong
further asks whether the legislature has otherwise proposed or taken ac-
tion such that the regulation at issue intrudes upon this ongoing debate.92
The assumption is that the legislative sphere is proper.
Yet while the first prong, with which we are most concerned, desig-
nates economic, political, and social concerns as competing considera-
tions, it does not necessarily command the political, rather than economic
or social sphere, as the arena through which one should negotiate the
resolution of those concerns. In this particular case, the courts do em-
brace political contest as the appropriate alternate mode; however, that
choice is underdetermined, even by the very terms of the Boreali test.
Indeed, the judges in this case sporadically advert to what hey con-
ceive of as the alternate decisional mode of science.93 Judge Renwick, in
examining the fourth Boreali prong, which counts agency expertise as a
factor favoring validity, chastises the BOH for failing to employ its pub-
lic health expertise, rather than its political judgment.94 Thus, "scientific
expertise" could have been an alternate domain for resolving conflicting
values. However, the judges choose not to assign the decision there, but
rather to politics, without much in the way of explanation for their
choice. The nostrum that "science" and "scientific reasoning" can objec-
tively and conclusively recommend a course of action has been so thor-
89. For an explanation of why and how that offloading occurs in health law, see Christina S.
Ho, In Defense of Circular Reasoning: The Affordable Care Act and the Resilience of Law and Self-
Reference, 5 WM. & MARY POL'Y REV. 1 (2013).
90. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide 1), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2013)
91. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1356 (N.Y. 1987).
92. Id.
93. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health
& Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide II), 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 212-13 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
94. Id. (complaining that "the Board did not bring any scientific or health expertise to bear in
creating the Portion Cap Rule").
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oughly debunked that I need not do so here.95 My argument depends not
upon the truth but rather on the court's implicit use of that misconcep-
tion, i.e., its lingering reliance upon the illusory notion of an objective
and determinate realm of scientific decision-making.96
While the courts proffer "politics" and "science" as the two chief
social decision-making institutions ostensibly distinct from and prefera-
ble to decision by legally promulgated rules, it is worth mentioning a
distant third. Judges Pigott and Renwick also suggest that perhaps the
appropriate decision-making arena should be private ordering. By this
mode, the decision of portion size would fall not to health regulation but
to individual choice. Renwick suggests this approach when she rebuts the
health department's internal justification argument by insisting that the
board must have balanced health concerns and concluded that they "out-
weigh the cost of infringing on individual rights to purchase a product
that the Board has never categorized as inherently dangerous."97 Pigott
echoes the sentiment: "This preference for an indirect means of achiev-
ing compliance with goals of healthier intake of sugary beverages was
itself a policy choice, relating to the degree of autonomy a government
permits its citizens to exercise . . . ."98
The court never fully develops the argument that such background
"rights" exist, but one can imagine a decision where the court defended
the principle of open individual choice and that arena as the proper mode
for prioritizing among health and other considerations. Had it done so,
then the court would have had to deny the legislatively enacted instruc-
tion to the agency to protect health, which inevitably limits open individ-
ual choice, and has even recently been understood to include near-
complete bans of substances like artificial trans fats.99 The judges here
opted for the other extreme instead, which is to maintain, rather remark-
ably, that health should have been protected without balancing and with-
95. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shilfling Sands: The Limits of Science in
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2004).
96. Here my use of the category "science" or "scientific expertise" follows CHRISTOPHER F.
EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 7-10
(1990) (describing "the trichotomy of decision making paradigms-adjudicatory fairness, scientific
expertise, and politics" which anchor the distinctions that judges implicitly and expressly draw upon
in administrative law disputes). Edley fully recognizes that science cannot operate without the exer-
cise of some judgment which is inevitably "political," acknowledging that "virtually all sciences,
involve[] uncertainties of prediction and measurement. Science alone, to the extent one can conceive
of it, cannot determine what to do with those uncertainties." Id. at 75. Instead he argues that despite
the conceptual instability of "science" as a distinct paradigm, it is this confused notion that courts
rely upon time and time again to discharge their duties in deciding administrative law cases. Id. at
72-77.
97. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (emphasis added).
98. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide III), 16 N.E.3d 538, 547 (N.Y. 2014) (emphasis added).
99. N.Y.C., N.Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.08 (2012); see also Lindsay F. Wiley, Com-
mentary, Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social Norms, and the Law: The Normative Impact of Prod-
uct Configuration Bans, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1877, 1881 n.9 (2014) (discussing the lack of principled
distinction between trans fat ban and soda portion cap).
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out regard to other concerns, including such "individual [background]
rights to purchase a product.""t Judge Pigott is accused by the dissent of
the same but disclaims support for an absolute ban by invoking a rights-
inflected argument that prohibition of sugary beverages altogether would
also amount to "policy-making, not rule-making" because it "interferes
with commonplace daily activities preferred by large numbers of peo-
ple."'0
What if the court had claimed squarely that this decision belonged
to individual choice? Would such a presumptive "right" or principle
come from the state separation of powers doctrine? Would it come from
some extreme theory of due process? Meanwhile, we need hardly re-
hearse the arguments that just as "pure" objective scientific decision-
making is a myth, no such unstructured realm of free individual choice
exists either. Market dynamics constrain individual choice, and the mar-
ket itself is already shaped by regulatory choices.102 Indeed this market-
norming argument underlies the soda portion cap measure itself. The
notes accompanying the BOH proposal stated that "People t nd to con-
sume more calories at meals that include large beverage sizes. [This
measure's] intent is to address the super-size trend and reacquaint New
Yorkers with smaller portion sizes, leading to a reduction in consumption
of sugary drinks among New York City residents.,0 3
Thus, the availability of individual choice as an arena apart from
law depends, among other things, on whether one believes that the indi-
vidual can exercise her private preferences or whether market ordering
permits exploitation of cognitive biases to manipulate individual choice.
Indeed, the above-mentioned justification that the health department cites
in its memo is the argument that an individual's true preferences are dis-
torted by the super-sizing trend and that the rule is designed to give the
individual the opportunity to choose consciously whether he or she wants
additional amounts of beverage.'0
100. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 209; see also New York Statewide III, 16 N.E.3d
at 558 (Read, J., dissenting) ("The Appellate Division ... appears to conclude that the Board would
have acted properly if only it had completely banned all sugary drinks within the City's borders.").
101. New York Statewide III, 16 N.E.3d at 548.
102. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (1997) ("Whether
people have a preference for a commodity, a right, or anything else is in part a function of whether
the government has allocated it to them in the first instance. There is no way to avoid the task of
initially allocating an entitlement (short of anarchy)." (footnote omitted)); see also Mark Kelman,
Legal Economists and Normative Social Theory (1987), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAw 326, 330-32 (Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998); Robert L. Hale, Coer-
cion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470,479-81 (1923).
103. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide 1), No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2013) (quoting notes accompanying N.Y.C., N.Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53 (2012)
(repealed 2013)).
104. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 205 (providing the DOHMH's summary of the
debate regarding the Soda Portion Cap Rule after the public hearing and quoting the DOHMH's
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These alternate arenas of science or private ordering are never ex-
pressly analyzed by the courts, and the courts seem to designate the polit-
ical arena as its favored arena by virtual acclamation.
6. Judge Arrogates the Decision and Simulates a Non-Legal
Method
The court's adoption of politics as the preferred forum for this mat-
ter poses its own puzzles. When should the presence of value conflict
require a diversion to "politics," much less some alternate decision-
making arena for resolution? The mere presence of value balancing can-
not be the answer because, if so, then all law would be legislative and the
distinction that the Boreali factors attempt to draw would collapse. If the
case is stripped of distracting and inconclusive doctrinal garb, we are left
with merely a judge, deciding that a particular balance or configuration
of competing values is unacceptable.'05 And perhaps to avoid the chagrin
of nakedly substituting her own conception of balance, the judge then
confers that task upon a different organ, in this case the legislature.
To consider this explanation, we look at what the court claims to be
doing to identify the instances of "improper" balancing that prompt di-
version of the matter away from legal rule setting. The court uses the
Boreali test, but the approach that test employs is one of balancing,
which hardly allays our suspicions that the judge comes close to nakedly
substituting her own preferred resolution of competing values. 107 Indeed,
the Boreali test is particularly indeterminate because, as the court re-
conclusion that "[i]f the proposal is adopted, customers intent upon consuming more than 16 ounces
would have to make conscious decisions to do so").
105. The Court of Appeals dissent says as much: "With all due respect to my colleagues, their
proposed ends-means test . .. harks back to long discredited formalistic approaches to administrative
law, which were seemingly objective but instead served as camouflage for enforcement of judicial
preferences." New York Statewide III, 16 N.E.3d at 560 (Read, J., dissenting).
106. See Jeremy Waldron, Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?, in EXPLORING LAW'S
EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 155, 173-76 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006)
(discussing how the judge, in confronting the materials before him, each side with its own conflict-
ing account of how to balance different competing values, is in the end choosing simply by conduct-
ing and insisting on his own balance, and imposing it as the tiebreaker). But see Ronald Dworkin,
Response, in EXPLORING LAW'S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 291, 304
(Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006) (responding that it is not Hercules' own balance but what he believes to
be the balance dictated by the principle that best fits the rest of the law, assuming that there is such a
fit to be found or constructed while maintaining political integrity).
107. T. Alexander Aleinikoff might characterize this "totality of the circumstances" test as less
strictly a "balancing" method, but rather a factor checklist or "analogical" type of reasoning, where
"one starts with [a] conception of what constitutes voluntariness and involuntariness and then asks
whether the particular situation shares more of . . . [those] elements." T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987). But Aleinikoff also
classifies Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor as a "balancing" case, Aleinikoff,
supra, at 947, even though in Schor, O'Connor weighs factors to determine whether "the 'essential
attributes of judicial power' are reserved to Article III courts" when the agency adjudicates. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). If O'Connor's approach there
constitutes balancing, rather than analogy, in a similar assessment under separation-of-powers doc-
trine of whether agency action too closely resembles that of a coordinate branch, then the distinction
is much less meaningful than Aleinikoff assumes.
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minds us, in this test no one factor is dispositive, and the test instead
"must be viewed in combination and in totality."'08
Admittedly, balancing factors in a legal test is not identical to first-
order balancing of competing values.'0 There is a large and vigorous
literature on proportionality and balancing, which I do not, for my pur-
poses, need to enter here."0 My argument merely depends upon the court
engaging in its own version, if slightly deflected, of the analysis it de-
nounces. It is enough that most would agree that it remains an open ques-
tion whether such judicial balancing is conclusively distinct from politi-
cal balancing.
Such judicial substitution for political balancing could not, of
course, proceed too baldly. Indeed, the courts engage in a sleight of hand
to disguise who decides. This imperative may explain why a profusion of
non-legal realms is implicated. Ostensibly, the doctrine says the legisla-
ture should decide, yet the judge is deciding when the legislature decides.
And what of the other realms we considered?
In deciding that science does not support the agency's decisions, in-
sofar as the agency's clear authority to take strong public health
measures either in the event of epidemic or to ban health hazards was not
triggered, the judges employed their lay version of scientific reasoning to
suggest that obesity is not an epidemic."' Judge Tingling attempted to
ground his decision in "scientific" distinctions-that the obesity threat
could not technically constitute an epidemic if the nature of the hazard
was chronic rather than infectious disease.12 This claim is fairly risible,
as epidemic has been used to refer to noninfectious disease since the se-
cond half of the twentieth century." 3
Renwick also treads on science when she argues that for the rule to
be valid, sugary soda itself would have to be declared a health hazard
without qualification.1 4 Otherwise, the health department has long been
understood as authorized to simply ban hazardous foods to protect
health, well within the "interstices" of the power delegated to the agency.
Indeed, the department exercised this authority in banning artificial trans
108. New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *7.
109. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 37, at 35-40, 46-47 (discussing the problems of balancing first-
order concerns against second-order concerns).
110. See, e.g., Mark Antaki, The Rationalism of Proportionality's Culture of Justification, in
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 284, 284 & n.l
(Grant Huscroft et al. eds., 2014); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role ofExclusionary
Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994).
111. See, e.g., New York Statewide 1, 2013 WL 1343607, at *16.
112. See id.
113. Paul M.V. Martin & Estelle Martin-Granel, 2,500-Year Evolution of the Term Epidemic,
12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 976, 979 (2006).
114. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health
& Mental Hygiene (New York Statewide II), 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
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fats."' Renwick dismisses such authority as inapplicable to the current
case, finding that soda cannot be a health hazard by virtue merely of con-
sumption in "excess quantity."'16 What reasoning skill does she bring to
bear in identifying hazards to health and the appropriate conditions under
which they pose a hazard? And why should an exposure fail to constitute
a health hazard if its effects require a threshold quantity? Some hazards
have zero-threshold dose-response curves, and some have U-shaped
curves.17 Numerous substances like fluorine, selenium, and other nutri-
ents are healthy at low doses and do not become hazards until they cross
a certain threshold. Renwick must make these dubious technical claims
to find that the rule fails prong two, namely, that it is not interstitial
rulemaking within the authority clearly delegated to the agency over
health hazards.'18 Scientific identification of a hazard and legal determi-
nation defining the statutory meaning of "health hazard" resemble dis-
torted mirror doubles.
Renwick's approach to hazard identification is by no means a fore-
gone conclusion, but instead a methodological choice. Other jurisdictions
have chosen differently. As Sunstein has noted, federal administrative
law takes a different approach to the question of hazard identification in
the face of qualifying considerations."'9 In his account, federal courts
grant federal agencies default permission to craft de minimis excep-
tions,120 whereas Renwick requires a per se ban of even insignificant
levels of risk from sugary soda.
Finally, while the court briefly mentions markets, i.e., private
choice or ordering, as another regime, it did not pursue its own sugges-
tion of private ordering as the proper mode. Had it chosen to do so, how-
ever, there is a ready-made form of judicial discourse, law and econom-
ics, which also involves the judicial performance of an ersatz methodol-
ogy to approximate the efficient results that might emerge from market
121processes.
In the soda portion cap case, the Boreali test itself is indeterminate,
but the underinclusiveness of the rule, by exposing the unavoidable bal-
ancing of health against other ends, provokes the court to act upon its
anxiety about the highly reticulated agency-crafted rule as the social tool
115. N.Y.C., N.Y., N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE §81.08(a) (2006); see, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Why do
Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219,
1238 (2014).
116. New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
117. See J.M. Davis & D.J. Svendsgaard, U-Shaped Dose-Response Curves: Their Occurrence
and Implications for Risk Assessment, 30 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENvTL. HEALTH 71 (1990).
118. See New York Statewide II, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 210-11.
119. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed.
2011); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).
2015] 131
DENVER LAWREVIEW
governing and accommodating value conflict. Politics, or even science or
markets, would be preferable. Is distinction between portion size and
number of portions somehow particularly irrational?1 22 Are judges rec-
ognizing some presumptive "right" to health protection, or presumptive
"right" to autonomy that ought not be easily outweighed by other consid-
erations? But where would such a right come from? These cannot plausi-
bly inhere in the separation of powers doctrine alone. Is it implicit in the
delegation to the City Council? But the analysis used to identify when
agencies ought not compromise was hardly a statutory analysis.
When we examine what judges use to determine when the matter
should be deflected away from the domain of rules, we find, notably, a
pidgin science, and a "balancing" test where no one or more prongs can
be said to be dispositive and where no particular threshold has been ar-
ticulated for satisfaction of the test. Rather than applying a clear rule, or
even a consistent principle, the courts engage in an elaborate disguise of
where rule-ness runs out.
B. Tummino v. Hamburg: Plan B OTC Switchl23
Plan B is a drug approved by the FDA in 1999 for use as an emer-
gency contraceptive.124 The active ingredient in the drug, a synthetic pro-
gesterone called levonorgestrel, was approved decades ago for uses other
than emergency contraception.125 Levonorgestrel is a component of many
daily oral contraceptives and intrauterine devices (IUDs).1 26 These long-
approved indications refer to the use of levonorgestrel prior to and during
intercourse.127 However, within a certain window of time post-
intercourse, levonorgestrel is also effective in reducing the risk of un-
wanted pregnancy.128 Thus, in 1997, the FDA solicited and approved
applications to market prescription-only levonorgestrel in specific doses
for this new post-intercourse, or "emergency contraception," use.129 The
approved product was called Plan B.
The chapter of this history that concerns us now arose in the mid-
2000s. At that time, the FDA came under public pressure to make a
product that was well-documented to be non-toxic available over-the-
counter (OTC). Eventually, the FDA did approve a switch to OTC status
for Plan B levonorgestrel as an emergency contraceptive, but only after
122. Cf Pac. Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
123. 1 am indebted to Bernard Bell for suggesting this case.
124. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
125. See Emergency Contraception Fact Sheet, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 2012),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs244/en/. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA 's
Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927, 931-33 (2014).
126. See id. at 931.
127. Id. at 931-33.
128. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
129. Id at 525.
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much delay, and crucially, only for women 18 and older.130 This decision
for age-restricted OTC availability was immediately challenged and re-
sulted in extensive judicial action, memorialized in a series of opinions
by Judge Korman of the Eastern District of New York, who was the pre-
siding judge in the lawsuit over this matter.'3 '
1. FDA Background: Narrow Indications and Scope of Regulatory
Action
I pause to describe the drug approval regime in brief as it explains
how the contours of FDA regulatory action, including regulatory "carve-
outs," are generally defined with respect to particular drugs. Since 1962,
drugs for humans have been subject to the modem pre-market approval
regime in the United States.132 Section 505(a) of the Food Drug & Cos-
metic Act (FDCA) prohibits the introduction of an unapproved "new
drug" into interstate commerce.133 To obtain the approval of the FDA, a
"new drug" must be demonstrated by substantial evidence to be safe and
effective "for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the proposed labeling thereof." 34
This "use" is the key parameter. Some may also refer to it as the
"claim," as "the effect [the product] purports or is represented to have,"
or the "indicated use."'35 Because the pre-approval requirements are only
triggered for "a new drug," the definition of "new drug" is crucial. The
FDCA defines a "new drug" as a drug "not generally recognized ... as
safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed."'36 Thus, the
"use" is the matter whose newness triggers regulatory requirements, not
the chemical entity itself.
Moreover, the safety and efficacy required for approval are judged
relative to that "use" or "indication." 3 7 Certainly a drug that is effective
against headaches might not be effective against brain tumors. Moreover,
a highly toxic drug that might be deemed "safe" for use in treating an
otherwise life-threatening brain tumor could be too dangerous for mere
headaches.
130. This age range was subsequently expanded to women 17 and older. See Diana R. H.
Winters, Intractable Delay and the Need to Amend the Petition Provisions of the FDCA, 90 IND. L.J.
1047, 1066 & 1067 n.148 (2015). On delay, see id. at 1067 & n.148.
131. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Tummino I,
603 F. Supp. 2d at 519; Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino Ill), No. 12-CV-763, 2013 WL 2631163
(E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013).
132. Drug Amendments of 1962 (Kefauver-Harris Amendment), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat.
780, 784 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
133. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
134. Id. § 355(d), (e).
135. Id. § 355(d)(5).
136. Id § 321(p)(1) (emphasis added).
137. See id. § 355(d) ("If the Secretary finds . . . there is a lack of substantial evidence that the
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof . .. he shall issue an order refusing to
approve. . .. ").
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If the indication is the all-important reference for the approval re-
gime, who then determines the indication? In practice, the drug manufac-
turers themselves, often called the "sponsors," define the indications.1 3 8
The sponsor is held to the indication in the sense that they must prove
safety and efficacy against that indication, must label adequately for that
indication, and cannot, at least in theory, actively market their products
for other indications.'3 9 However, the sponsor's ability to stipulate the
indication has gone largely unchallenged with a few exceptions I de-
scribe below.140
The malleability of indication engenders regulatory difficulties.
Clinical trial data is needed to supply evidence of drug's safety and effi-
cacy for any given indication, so the clinical trial's parameters are usual-
ly narrowed to the indication's parameters.141 However, those controlled
parameters often fail to reflect circumstances of actual use in the general
population. The FDA must engage in a particular type of inference, gen-
eralizing the results obtained in the enrolled clinical trial population to
predict the results in the actual population. The threat that the clinical
trial population might skew compared to the actual users of the drug once
it is marketed always lurks in the background.142 For this and many other
reasons, drug approval requires judgment, rather than mechanical calcu-
lation of scientifically determinate outcomes. To inform and exercise this
judgment, the FDA has a number of tools, including in-house experts in
various offices within the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER).14 3 They also have the authority to convene advisory committees
to weigh in on the decision.14
138. Ass'n of Am., Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 206, 216
(D.D.C. 2002); see id. at 218 (contending that it is "Congress' will ... [that] the 'manufacturer ...
through his representations in connection with its sale . .. determine the use to which the article is to
be put"' (quoting S. REP. No. 73-493, at 3 (1934))).
139. However, they often approach promotion of the off-label use through various indirect
means, and indeed are arguably protected by the First Amendment in engaging in at least as much.
See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 160-62 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Wash. Legal Found. v.
Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 337 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ( "In disposing of the case in this manner, we cer-
tainly do not criticize the reasoning or conclusions of the district court."), vacating in part 56 F.
Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999); Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60-61, 74 (D.D.C.
1998), injunction amended by, 36 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.D.C. 1999).
140. See, e.g., Michael J. Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills-A System Popping Under
Too Much Physician Discretion? A Law-Policy Prescription to Make Drug Approval More Mean-
ingful in the Delivery of Health Care, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1085, 1102 (2012) ("Industry sponsors
hold broad discretion to tailor clinical research and to apply (or not) for approval of specific uses in
applications for market access, which provides an incentive to limit the scope of applications for
market access, get approval, and then exploit physician off-label use through sponsorship of research
and conferences and the distribution of medical journal publications.").
141. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
142. See, e.g., Michelle N. Meyer, Regulating the Production of Knowledge: Research Risk-
Benefit Analysis and the Heterogeneity Problem, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 237, 241-42 (2013).
143. See CDER Offices and Divisions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucmO
7
5128.htm (last updated June 26, 2015).
144. 21 U.S.C. § 355(n).
[Vol. 93:1134
EXCEPTIONS MEET ABSOLUTISM
Because the indication is often defined by the drug sponsor, it
comes as no surprise that the indication's scope serves the sponsor's in-
terests. For instance, if a drug is possibly effective in a broad, and thus
high-revenue indication (such as depression or anxiety), but it is easier
and cheaper to run trials and get approval for a narrow indication (such
as schizophrenia), the sponsors may design a study for a narrow indica-
tion to get the drug to market.145 Because the FDA approvals regulate
labeling and how drugs are marketed, but do not limit the "practice of
medicine" by physicians,1'" the drug sponsor may still reap profits if doc-
tors happen to prescribe the drug "off-label" to patients with other condi-
tions.147
Furthermore, indications, like rules, can be narrowed along a num-
ber of different dimensions, not merely along the lines of disease diagno-
sis. Indications are frequently narrowed to subpopulations to minimize
the sponsor's cost and risk as well. Drug manufacturers maintain that
they can define their chosen indication to exclude individuals with heart
conditions or compromised immune systems from the use indicated in
the labeling if they did not enroll those groups in the clinical trial.1 4 8 It is
risky and expensive to enroll pregnant women, for instance, in clinical
trials, so drug manufacturers may often simply stipulate in the labeling
that such product is not approved for use in pregnant women.149
Some of the same risks and difficulties in obtaining effective con-
sent for pediatric patients led drug sponsors to decline to enroll children
145. There were a number of drugs, like gabapentin originally approved for narrow indications
like schizophrenia or seizures, then sold more broadly in the 1990's for conditions like depression or
anxiety. See, e.g., Duff Wilson, Side Effects May Include Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at
BUI. Such drugs have been the subject of recent litigation. See, e.g., Neurontin Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig. v. Pfizer, Inc., 712 F.3d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom., Pfizer, Inc. v.
Kaiser Found., 134 S. Ct. 786 (2013).
146. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public
Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 225 (2011).
147. Much has been written on this subject of off-label use. See id at 225-26; see also Ryan
Abbott & Ian Ayres, Can Bayesian Extrapolation Improve FDA Regulation of Off-Label Uses of
Drugs and Devices?, 4 FOOD & DRUG POL'Y FORUM 1, 1-2 (2014); Aaron S. Kesselheim &
Michelle M. Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion in an Era of Expanding
Commercial Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1539, 1539 (2014); Malinowski, supra note 140, at
1085-86.
148. See Ass'n of Am., Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 217-18
(D.D.C. 2002) ("1 need to acknowledge the limits of FDA's authority. It is our job to review drug
applications for the indications suggested by the manufacturer. We do not have the authority to
require manufacturers to seek approval for indications which they have not studied. Thus, as a matter
of law, if an application contains indications only for adults, we're stuck." (quoting a speech by FDA
Commissioner, David Kessler)); David Loughnot, Note & Comment, Potential Interactions of the
Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J. L. &
MED. 365, 370-71 (2005) (calling this practice of testing treatments for medically differentiable
subgroups of a disease "salami slicing"); see also Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of
Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. PRODUCTS & TOXICS LIABILITY 139, 144-45 (1994).
149. Barbara A. Noah, The Inclusion of Pregnant Women in Clinical Research, 7 ST. LOUIS U.
J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 353, 355-57 (2014).
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in their clinical trials.50 Meanwhile, because of physiological and other
differences distinguishing children from adults, including developing
organ systems or higher metabolism rates, drug sponsors and regulators
were reluctant to generalize adult trial results to the pediatric popula-
tion. 151 Often, they would simply narrow the indication to, for example,
the treatment of depression in patients over the age of eighteen, making
no claim as to the drug's safety or efficacy in children.152
These examples, however, suggest the limits of the prevailing para-
digm that allows manufacturers by and large to control how the drug is
presented for use and, therefore, the standards to which the manufactur-
ers are subjecting themselves.53 Should entire populations be denied
information on safety, efficacy, and dosing simply because manufactur-
ers can restrict indications at will? Does our food and drug law take no
account of the social expectations of that drug's use? Are boundaries
drawn along the lines of age, pregnancy, or immune function equivalent
to line drawing based on other population parameters? As it turns out, the
paradigm that defers to the manufacturers' stated claims in defining the
indication has been checked to some extent by Congress and the FDA.
Now, manufacturers must report certain demographics of their clinical
trial enrollment.154 Drug sponsors are prohibited from excluding men and
women of reproductive age from their trials.'55 The FDA also tried to
issue a regulation mandating pediatric testing and labeling for drugs that
it deemed therapeutically meaningful, needed by substantial numbers of
children, and feasible for study in the pediatric subpopulation.15 6 The
regulation was struck as ultra vires by a federal district court, but subse-
quently codified by Congress, which also authorized six-month addition-
150. See, e.g., Kurt R. Karst, Comment, Pediatric Testing of Prescription Drugs: The Food
and Drug Administration's Carrot and Stick for the Pharmaceutical Industry, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
739, 748 n.44 (2000).
151. See id. at 748 & n.44.
152. See id. at 747.
153. Malinowski, supra note 140, at 1119 ("Similarly, using the regulatory process to attempt
to impose commercial uses on new drug candidates or specific types of human clinical trials on drug
developers would invite allegations of undue impediment on the commercial freedom that is the
touchstone of our private market system and introduce susceptibility to legal challenges.").
154. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(b)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) ("The
Secretary shall, in consultation with the Director of the National Institutes of Health and with repre-
sentatives of the drug manufacturing industry, review and develop guidance, as appropriate, on the
inclusion of women and minorities in clinical trials required by clause (A)."); see also U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: COLLECTION OF RACE AND ETHNICITY DATA IN
CLINICAL TRIALS 1-2 (2005). For a more recent example, see Food and Drug Administration Safety
and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 907, 126 Stat. 993, 1092-93 (2012).
155. PETER BARTON HUT-r ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 699 (4th ed.
2014).
156. See Karst, supra note 150, at 753-55. The FDA may waive the requirement if studies are
impossible or highly impracticable, if the product is not likely to be used in substantial numbers of
pediatric patients, or if it provides no meaningful therapeutic benefit over existing therapies, among




al exclusivity to reward such pediatric studies.157 These measures now
give drug sponsors some duty and incentive to generate pediatric safety,
efficacy, and dosing information.'58
2. Plan B Background
When levonorgestrel was finally expressly approved for emergency
contraception in 1999, this indication proved controversial-especially
among abortion opponents and others who raised concerns about the
incentives for sexual promiscuity. 159
Progestin compounds, of which levonorgestrel is one, are similar to
hormones naturally present in the body, especially during pregnancy.iso
Progestin has a number of effects, including "reduc[ing] the number of
sperm cells in the uterine cavity, immobili[zing] sperm, and . . . de-
lay[ing] or prevent[ing] ovulation."16 1 While some of these effects occur
prefertilization, some have contended that progesterone-like hormones
could also change the uterine lining, possibly rendering it less hospitable
to the implantation of a fertilized egg, an effect that could constitute a
postfertilization event, though this has never been shown.162 This implan-
tation blockage is particularly controversial among those who consider
human life to begin at fertilization, as they construe the postintercourse
interference with implantation of a fertilized egg to be the termination of
human life. 63
However, it has been impossible to verify that levonorgestrel blocks
postfertilization implantation. Judge Korman notes that "it would be 'un-
ethical and logistically difficult to conduct the necessary research' to
157. See Karst, supra note 150, at 762-63.
158. Draft Guidance for Industry on the Pediatric Research Equity Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,233,
53,234 (Sept. 7, 2005); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1)(D). The author helped to draft this Act as a
legislative assistant to then-Senator Hillary Clinton.
159. See, e.g., Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 7, 2006, at 48.
160. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
161. MARCIA CROSSE, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-109, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION: DECISION PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER
MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 12 (2005) [herein-
after GAO REPORT].
162. As would other contraceptives, including progesterone-containing daily oral contracep-
tives, as well as intrauterine devices, whether hormonal or copper. But see Tummino v. Hamburg
(Tummino ll), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (explaining how Plan B labeling mentions
the possibility of interference with implantation "without affirmative evidence" that the drug oper-
ates in this way); Pam Belluck, No Abortion Role Seen for Morning-After Pill, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
2012, at Al (citing experts explaining that it takes a long time to change the endometrium lining, and
emergency contraception is a one-shot treatment).
163. See The Human Life Bill Appendix, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 286 (1982) (statement of John D. Biggers,




conclusively establish that levonorgestrel-based contraceptives do not
interfere with implantation."'6
In 1999, when the new drug application (NDA) for levonorgestrol
used for the emergency contraception indication (Plan B) was first ap-
proved, it was initially approved for prescription use only.'65 Pharmaceu-
ticals are often introduced in this way and later strategically switched to
OTC status by drug sponsors to maximize the revenue generated by the
drug,'66 especially since a switch involving a new clinical study can gar-
ner the sponsor an additional three-year exclusivity "after the exclusivity
and patent periods for the prescription products have expired."67
3. Tummino v. Hamburg: The Case Description
In 2001, after Plan B had been on the market as an FDA-approved
prescription drug for two years, outside citizens petitioned for an OTC
switch.'68 Indeed, in 2003, the Plan B drug sponsors themselves also re-
quested such a switch.16 9 If initiated by someone other than the drug
sponsor, such as citizens or the FDA, a switch can be conducted by
means of a rulemaking.170 If the plan sponsor initiates the switch, they
generally do so through a process similar to a new drug approval applica-
tion called a supplemental new drug application (SNDA).' 7 1 Under either
scenario, the standard governing such a switch is set forth in FDCA §
503B and its accompanying regulation.17 2
i. The Statutory Standard for OTC Switch
Under FDCA §503(b)(1)(a), prescription dispensation is required
for a drug if "because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful ef-
fect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its
use, [it] is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner
164. Tummino 11, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (quoting GAO REPORT, supra note 161, at 13). Any
such post-implantation effect could also be the result of pre-conception use of birth control pills or
an IUD. See generally, Judy Peres & Jeremy Manier, "Morning-After Pill" Not Abortion, Scientists
Say, CHI. TRIB., June 20,2005, at CNl.
165. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
166. See, e.g., Laura Mahecha, Rx-to-OTC Switches: Trends and Factors Underlying Success,
5 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 380, 380 (2006).
167. RICHARD M. COOPER ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 465 (David Ad-
ams et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter FDLI] (referring to the regulatory exclusivities available
under 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)-(iv)).
168. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 526. FDA had always recognized the prescription/OTC
distinction under regulations promulgated in 1938 implementing FDCA § 502(f), requiring that
labeling bear "adequate directions for use." HUTT ET AL., supra note 155, at 802. "Prescription"
drugs were exempt from the requirement of adequate directions for use, but only if the product bore
a label directing that the product be used only by or on the prescription of a physician. Id Subse-
quently Congress, in the Durham-Humphrey Amendments of 1951, passed FDCA § 503B. Id
169. The first SNDA submitted, unrestricted by age, was denied by FDA. Tummino 1, 603 F.
Supp. 2d at 523. The second SNDA was for women 16 and older. Id. The third submitted was for
women 17 and older. Id. FDA then approved for 18 and older. Id.
170. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 503(e)(2)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 353(e)(2)(B) (2012).
171. See Tumnino1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
172. Prescription-Exemption Procedure, 21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b) (2015).
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licensed by law to administer such drug." 73 Section 503(b)(3) continues:
"The Secretary may by regulation remove drugs . . . from the [prescrip-
tion requirements in] paragraph (1) of this subsection when such re-
quirements are not necessary for the protection of the public health."74
Judge Korman proceeds to quote the FDA regulation specifying that
it will implement this language in such a way that:
Any drug limited to prescription use . . . shall be exempted from pre-
scription-dispensing requirements when the Commissioner finds such
requirements are not necessary for the protection of the public health
... and he finds that the drug is safe and effective for use in self-
medication as directed in proposed labeling.175
Thus, public health, constituted by safety and efficacy, is under-
stood to be the chief consideration justifying OTC switch.
ii. More Case Background
Here, the sponsor's switch request was accompanied by significant
amounts of safety data; however, the FDA repeatedly hesitated to grant
OTC status for Plan B.1 76 The original citizen petition was filed in 2001,
and the FDA did not issue a final response for over five years.77
In the meantime, however, the FDA was far from idle; multiple
struggles played out behind the scenes. Despite the FDA's decision not
to require pediatric pharmacokinetic studies for the SNDA, the FDA
early in the process flagged the question of whether the OTC switch
might present different risk-behavior concerns for patients of different
ages. The FDA thus considered the option that the switch might be
undertaken only for those women above a certain age threshold. After
five years of maneuvering and negotiation, including Senate obstruction
of the confirmation of two successive FDA Commissioners pending pro-
gress on this issue, the FDA finally approved the switch for women
eighteen and older shortly before the confirmation of Bush-appointed
Commissioner Andrew Von Eschenbach.179
173. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
174. Id. § 353(b)(3) (emphasis added).
175. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 524-25 (emphasis added) (quoting Prescription-Exemption
Procedure, 21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b) (2015)).
176. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
177. Id. at 536.
178. See id at 529. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §505B(a)(4), as discussed supra note
154, allows FDA to waive pediatric studies for reasons like lack of feasibility. Manufacturers may
still voluntarily conduct such studies. In this case, pharmacokinetic, toxicity or dosing studies would
not have answered the concerns raised, which asked for actual use data.




This age delimitation is the feature that renders the FDA's decision
an example of the phenomenon of an ex ante exception ultimately judged
invalid. OTC status for Plan B was effectively approved for all women
except those under eighteen.180
A women's health coalition sued in January 2005 to contest the re-
jection of their petition for full OTC availability.' 1 Despite the ban on
underage purchase of smoking cessation products, plaintiffs claimed that
OTC status had never been conditioned upon an age threshold before. 8 2
Even if this were true, it is worth noting that OTC status had been condi-
tioned upon other characteristics before, including different diagnosis,
strength, route of administration, dosage form, or even sex of the pa-
tient.183 Moreover, other types of approval, such as new drug approvals,
routinely contain age exclusions, as discussed above.
Judge Korman found for the plaintiffs and declared the restricted
OTC switch with the age-eighteen cutoff to be "arbitrary and capri-
cious."185 Korman remanded to the FDA, but in the period following
remand, the Obama Administration succeeded the Bush Administration,
ushering in new FDA and health department leadership with ostensibly
different views on sexual morality.'86
Yet the new Administration, on December 7, 2011, once again an-
nounced a decision to age restrict the OTC availability of emergency
contraception, which had by now been reformulated by the manufacturer
as a one-pill version.'8 7 The drug would be available OTC only to wom-
180. In a practical sense, this exception was quite difficult to implement and entailed a number
of other restrictions. The FDA maintained that in order to implement the age-related exception
rigorously, all Plan B products had to be carried behind the pharmacist counter, rather than on the
pharmacy shelves. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino l), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
This unusual arrangement was dubbed the "BTC" or "behind-the-counter," regime in contrast to
rather than OTC, (over-the-counter). See id.
181. Id. at 165-66.
182. The FDA has created age-based restrictions when enacting an Rx-to-OTC switch for only
one other class of drugs, nicotine products (such as Nicorette gum), for which only persons 18 years
and older may obtain the products OTC. See GAO REPORT, supra note 161, at 7. Nicorette gum,
incidentally, was given OTC status in 1996, long before the separate tobacco product regime r cog-
nizing age distinctions was passed by Congress. See Information for Consumers (Drugs): Now
Available Without Prescription, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucml43547.htm (last updated Aug. 12,
2011).
183. FDLI, supra note 167, at 466 (citing examples including meclizine, which is available
only by prescription for vertigo but OTC for nausea with motion sickness, clotrimoxazole in pre-
scription form for certain types of candidiasis while OTC for "athlete's foot, ring worm, and jock
itch," and loperamide which is prescription for chronic diarrhea, but OTC for acute diarrhea).
184. See HuTr ET AL., supra note 155, at 807 (identifying conditions on OTC availability,
including gender).
185. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino I), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
186. See id at 549.
187. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino ll), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (referring
to Plan B One-Step).
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en age seventeen and above showing age verification. Among the re-
markable aspects of this second OTC grant was that it was rendered not
by the FDA, whose Commissioner, Margaret Hamburg, adjudged there
to be "adequate and reasonable, well-supported, and science-based evi-
dence that Plan B . . . is safe and effective and should be approved for
nonprescription use for all females of child-bearing potential."188 Instead,
the decision to age restrict the OTC access was made by the supervening
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, overriding
the Commissioner and "invoking her authority under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act to execute its provisions."'89
Judge Korman once again ruled the age-restricted grant to be "arbi-
trary" and "capricious,"' 9 and instructed the FDA to grant the citizen
petition "mak[ing] levonorgestrel-based emergency contraceptives avail-
able without a prescription and without point-of-sale or age restrictions
within thirty days."'91
In this case, the age-exception feature rendered the FDA's decision
vulnerable as compared to blunter, less-contoured measures. Other emer-
gency contraceptives, like ella, are prescription-only products.'92 Even
the levonorgestrel birth control pill (the "mini pill") remains prescrip-
tion-only, even though it is exactly the same chemical entity as Plan B. 93
The FDA is thus allowed to draw lines between one emergency contra-
ceptive product and another, and may even distinguish preintercourse
levonorgestrel from postintercourse levonorgestrel despite scant scien-
tific support for the mini-pill's prescription status.194 However, balancing
access needs along the lines of adult and pediatric indications seemed to
trigger doubt. The court seems to envision the FDA's range of action for
postintercourse levonorgestrel as restricted to fully OTC or fully pre-
scription but no ability to offer OTC access with an exception. Indeed,
the judge ruled that the FDA's decision to exclude women under 18 from
188. Id (quoting Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D., on Plan B
One-Step (Dec. 7, 2011)).
189. Id (quoting Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D., on Plan B
One-Step (Dec. 7, 2011)).
190. Id at 197.
191. Id
192. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves ellarm Tablets for Prescription
Emergency Contraception (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm222428.htm.
193. See Olga Khazan, Birth Control Without a Prescription, ATLANTIC, Sept. 19, 2014,
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/toward-a-prescription-free-birth-control-
pill/380464/ (citing the vice chair of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
Committee on Gynecologic Practice Bulletins saying that the mini-pill should be the first to be
offered over-the-counter because of its safety profile); see also Scout Richters, Note & Comment,
The Moral Interception of Oral Contraception: Potential Constitutional Claims Against the FDA 'S
Prescription Requirement for a Progestin-Only Birth Control Pill, 22 J.L. & POL'Y 393, 408 (2013)
(saying that levonorgestrel is the substance in many progestin-only mini-pills).
194. See id. Indeed, the AMA has passed a resolution calling for the OTC availability of the
mini-pill. See AM. MED. Ass'N, 2013 ANNUAL MEETING MEMORIAL RESOLUTIONS 464 (2013),
http://www.ama-assn.org/assets/meeting/2013ala13-resolutions.pdf.
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OTC availability was what rendered the decision "arbitrary and capri-
cious" as it involved improper factors. 9
5. Value Conflict
i. No Clear Statutory Foreclosure of Offsetting Values
Korman pointed to FDCA § 503B as stating that switches had to be
determined by health standards such as "protection of public health" and
"safety and effectiveness."l9 6 But the statutory text itself does not fore-
close expansive interpretations of the factors relevant to public health or
safety. If the statute is open to these other interpretations, then FDA's
inclusion of behavioral risk compensation effects should enjoy Chevron
deference.197 Indeed, if we accept Sunstein's default canons, the courts
should favor readings that allow consideration of harms that might offset
the health benefits of drug availability. The statute requires the Secretary
to consider whether prescription status is "necessary for public health"
and suggests that broader social factors should be considered as part of
the assessment of safety and effectiveness.198 Section 503B instructs con-
sideration of factors beyond toxicity, including "other potentiality for
harmful effect" and any safety problems arising because of "collateral
measures necessary to [the drug's] use." 99 This language has long in-
cluded consideration of harms that arise not from the drug itself but from
the changes in patient behavior, such as delayed health-seeking behavior,
due to the drug's availability.200
195. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 542, 544, 547-48 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(reviewing the State Farm articulation of the standard).
196. Id. at 525, 548; see also Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 169
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[T]he standard for determining whether contraceptives or any other drug should
be available over-the-counter turns solely on the ability of the consumer to understand how to use
the particular drug 'safely and effectively.' . . . I decide this case based only on my understanding of
the applicable standard." (citation omitted)).
197. See Chevron, U.S., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
198. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 503B(b)(3), 505(d), 21 U.S.C.§§ 353(b)(3),
355(d) (2012).
199. Id. § 353(b)(1)(A).
200. See United States v. Article of Drug, Labeled Decholin, 264 F. Supp. 473, 482-84 (E.D.
Mich. 1967) (refusing to grant summary judgment allowing OTC distribution, even if the drug itself
is pharmacologically safe, because FDA may consider the risk behavior the drug's availability might
induce, i.e., causing the patient to delay seeking professional diagnosis to discover an underlying
condition that requires alternate treatment). The FDA's consideration of "risk substitution" or "risk
compensation" behavior is also evident insofar as the approval of Truvada (a product for the prophy-
lactic use of antiretrovirals among those at-risk of HIV infection) is conditioned upon postmarketing
studies of whether Truvada affects behavior that might increase the chances of HIV transmission.
See Kristen Underhill, Risk-Taking and Rulemaking: Addressing Risk Compensation Behavior
Through FDA Regulation of Prescription Drugs, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 377, 382, 417-19 (2013).
Similarly, the FDA's longstanding pre-2009 stance to apply the NDA paradigm to nicotine products
that make therapeutic claims, like cessation products, but not to treat modified-risk cigarettes (like
low-tar products) as therapeutic products, involves recognition that risk substitution (smoking more
cigarettes, or taking longer drags to compensate) might nullify any therapeutic effects of the product.
Id. at 395. This stance is echoed in the FDCA § 911(g) requirement that risk be measured by "actual
use." 21 U.S.C.§ 387k(g).
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Longtime food and drug law observers, including Peter Barton Hutt,
have argued persuasively that that the statutory language thus accommo-
dates broader societal concerns.201 The FDA often requires "actual use
studies" for OTC switches precisely to test for these broader concerns
such as "compliance issues, including off-label usage . . . [and] overdose
or abuse potential."202 If the use of one drug, itself safe in vivo, would
restrict patients' food or other medications, those considerations would
203be relevant. None of these factors concern merely the physiological
effects of the drug. They involve reasoning about value-laden human and
social behavior, the dynamics of which may be more difficult to capture
in a clinical study and may complicate the extrapolation of such study to
a broader population.
Korman also points to the "purpose" of § 503B as proscribing the
use of political values beyond public health narrowly construed to justify
agency practice. But the Senate report he cites does not contemplate pure
health justifications, unalloyed by other values.20 Congress declared that
its intent was "to 'relieve retail pharmacists and the public from burden-
some and unnecessary restrictions on the dispensing of drugs that are
safe for use without the supervision of a physician."' 205 This statement
acknowledges "burden" and a degree of "necessity" as broad factors
apart from health that the FDA should consider when deciding whether
to make an otherwise safe drug available OTC. None of this is to suggest
that Judge Korman's requirement that the FDA extrapolate the data justi-
fying OTC status for older women to younger age ranges is incorrect, but
simply that deciding to extrapolate is a matter of judgment, indeed dis-
cretion, the scope of which, under statutory text and purpose, one can
reasonably construe to encompass more than consistent technical appli-
cation of health science standards.
201. Peter Barton Hutt, A Legal Framework for Future Decisions on Transferring Drugs from
Prescription to Nonprescription Status, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 427, 436 (1982). He identifies
more than one statutory factor that must be considered, not just toxicity, but other potentiality for
harmful effect, specifically, the "method of use or collateral measures necessary to use." Id. at 433.
Of the last, he says, "Congress intended this factor to have the broadest possible scope. It encom-
passes all aspects of the circumstances under which a drug is used, including broad questions of
social policy. There is perhaps no issue involving drug use that cannot properly be brought into
consideration under this factor." Id. at 436.
202. FDLI, supra note 167, at 473.
203. Lars Noah, Treat Yourself Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails American
Health Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 366 (2006) ("Although the statute and regulations pro-
vide some general criteria for differentiating between prescription and OTC products, ultimately that
determination must be made on an ad hoc basis and without clear guidance... Other harmful effects
may include the risk of interactions with food or other drug products and the potential for abuse."
(footnote omitted)).
204. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
205. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-946, at 1 (1951)).
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ii. Arbitrary and Capricious or Explained by Permissible Rea-
sons?
Korman, in excluding these other social considerations, must rely
less on text, and instead on doctrine that subjective "bad faith" will not
only overcome the record rule but also support a finding of arbitrary and
-206capricious action.
What then does Korman classify as bad faith? It is not clear, and in-
deed other scholars have written of how this case highlights the muddled
state of administrative law doctrine in this area.207 Bad faith might be
thought to consist of dissembling or duress, but what turns out to be bad
faith in Korman's view is the consideration of additional "political" fac-
tors, which he defines as norms, policies, or preferences other than those
of health science.208 In other words, he manages to frame his opinion
such that mere value conflict, rather than lying, is what renders an ex-
emption "bad faith."
Whether the consideration of more than one norm is sufficient to
relegate a decision to the "political" sphere is one that this Article seeks
to probe more deeply, so Korman's decision to assume it here bears re-
mark, especially when he could have based his decision on other grounds
instead. Is it indeed a foregone conclusion that the agency must consider
nothing other than health concerns? Surely agencies can also consider
209
matters like priorities when it comes to enforcement. Moreover, as
health standards do not mechanically apply themselves, the FDA is ex-
pected to use judgment or "discretion," and one control upon discretion
is political accountability.21 0 The subjection of the FDA to the political
processes of nomination and confirmation would suggest intention to
employ this control.
Once one proves the existence of other considerations, political or
otherwise, there is still some distance to go before the presence of non-
health considerations constitutes decision by unreasoned and arbitrary
caprice. What in Korman's decision carries us that extra distance? What
administrative law doctrines do the work? Neither deceit nor falsehood
206. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that
the finding of subjective bad faith will weigh in favor of finding arbitrary and capricious action
(citing Latecoere Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 19 F.3d 1342, 1356 (11th Cir. 1994); James
Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1996))).
207. Heinzerling, supra note 125, at 958-59.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 259-66.
209. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
210. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J.
729, 732-36, 740-45, 750 (1979); see also David F. Cavers, The Legal Control of the Clinical
Investigation of Drugs: Some Political, Economic, and Social Questions, 98 DAEDALUS 427, 430
(1969) ("[T]his evaluation does not call for simply a 'yes' or 'no' judgment. One dosage level may
be safe, another questionable, but the safer dosage level may be of doubtful efficacy. A satisfactory
answer may lie in between. Negotiation follows.").
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was relied upon as the touchstone of bad faith.2 1' Instead, Korman points
to a series of arbitrary "departures" from prior agency practice.2 12
a) Substantive Transgression or Political Cooptation?
In condemning the first decision to age restrict, made by the Bush
Administration FDA, Korman does marshal suggestions of "improper
political influence . . . showing that the political pressure was intended to
and did cause the agency's action to be influenced by factors not relevant
under the controlling statute."213 It is noteworthy that Korman does not
go so far as to claim that any of the instances of political pressure rose to
the level of procedural violations; he simply considers them as evidence
that other substantive factors entered into the decision-making. Take for
instance the first sign of political consideration that Korman cites, the
involvement of the White House. On the day that the Plan B sponsor first
submitted its SNDA requesting OTC status, then-FDA Commissioner
Mark McClellan conversed with a White House domestic policy advisor
about the matter and provided several status updates thereafter.2 14 Kor-
man declined to rule that these were ex parte communications: "Whether
or not it was permissible for the FDA to discuss such questions with the
White House, these discussions were not the norm for the FDA with re-
spect to this type of decision."2 15 In other words, the process was not the
problem; the possible entry of a non-public health factor was measured,
not only by the existence of a channel of external communication, but
also by any departure from previous FDA practice which Korman pre-
sumes to then require justification in terms of public health to satisfy
State Farm requirements for reasoned decision-making.216
The category of facts showing bad faith includes those instances
throughout the process when the FDA personnel were answerable to po-
litical officers. Again, Korman slightly overstates the situation in a way
that implausibly exiles conflicting values pressed by the public: the FDA
leadership, subject to presidential appointment and congressional con-
211. The magistrate judge allowed discovery beyond the record to look for just such evidence.
See Heinzerling, supra note 125, at 953-54.
212. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
213. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting
Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus, 740 F.2d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 1984)).
214. Id. at 527. "Status reports" are excluded from barred ex parte communications under
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (2012).
215. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 547. Korman was presumably referring to 5 U.S.C. §§
554(d), 557(d).
216. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 56-57
(1983) (explaining the arbitrary and capricious standard and requiring under such standard that
NHTSA "supply a reasoned analysis" for revoking the passive restraints rules and not considering
airbags or nondetachable passive belts (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 548 ("While it may have been rational
for the FDA to consider adolescent cognitive development in its evaluation of Plan B as an OTC
drug, plaintiffs have presented unrebutted evidence that the FDA's focus on these behavioral con-
cems stemmed from political pressure rather than permissible health and safety concerns.").
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firmation, is expected to be politically accountable.217 What is the politi-
cal appointment and confirmation process for if not to inject a political
dimension into the FDA's exercise of its discretion and interpretation of
its governing law? Yet Korman disparages the role that the appointment
and confirmation process played.
In the first confirmation battle over the elevation of Acting Com-
missioner Lester Crawford in 2005, Senators Hillary Clinton and Patty
Murray put holds on his confirmation until receiving a commitment that
the FDA would decide the Plan B OTC petition by a certain date.2 18
However, once confirmed, Crawford backed out of the promise and
missed the deadline.2 19
When the Senate next considered a nominee for Commissioner, the
Senators again took a stand, demanding FDA action.220 One day before
the confirmation hearing, the FDA at long last announced the grant of
OTC status, albeit restricted to women eighteen and over.221
Korman is unquestionably correct that politics and social considera-
tions entered the FDA's decision-making in this case, and he hinges his
decision upon the presence of those "political" considerations. What is
harder to tell is if they entered in a way allowed by statute, process re-
quirements, and permissible reasoning or not.
b) Departures Justified by the Limits of Inference from
Sample?
For Korman, the chief facts showing lack of good faith reasoned
decision-making lie in what he calls FDA's "[d]epartures from [i]ts
[o]wn [p]olicies."222
The first departure he questions is the FDA's decision not to adopt
the Advisory Committee's recommendations.2 23 The Advisory Commit-
tee had voted unanimously that Plan B was safe for OTC use and voted
27-1 that the data from an "actual use study" (AUS) could be general-
224
ized or extrapolated to the overall population.22 Finally, the committee
voted 23-4 "to approve Plan B for over-the-counter status without age or
point-of-sale restrictions."225
217. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J.
257, 262-63 & n.24 (noting the FDA's lack of independence and the periodic proposal that it should
be made so); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163,
1207-09 (2013) (discussing the agencies direct accountability to HHS).
218. Tummino I, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
219. Id
220. Id at 523, 546.
221. Id at 546.
222. See id. at 547-49.
223. Id. at 547.
224. Id. at 529, 547-48.
225. Id. at 529.
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The FDA is not required to convene advisory committees.226 Advi-
sory committee decisions are therefore hardly expected to be conclusive,
which Korman himself concedes: "While the Advisory Committee does
not have the final say regarding the OTC switch applications, the FDA
has followed advisory committee recommendations in every OTC switch
application in the last decade . . . ."227 Actually, in 2001, the FDA first
ignored its advisory committees on the health-insurer led petitions to
228switch antihistamines, such as Claritin, to OTC status. Meanwhile, it is
not clear that ten years worth of decisions is the right subset from which
to judge FDA's practices. Nor is it clear that the OTC switch decisions
are the correct category of decision from which the FDA's policy toward
advisory committees should be inferred. Certainly, if one looks at the
FDA's drug decisions, including NDA approvals and revocations, there
are numerous instances where the FDA has acted contrary to its advisory
committees.229 Again, the portrait of the FDA's past practice as deferring
consistently to advisory committee decisions is overstated by Korman-
not an unreasonable stance but also not a foregone conclusion. Despite
my agreement with him on the outcome in this case, my point in this
Article is to show that the outcome, and the grounds recited in the opin-
ion, were choices Korman made, leading us to ask what motivates these
choices. Here, we hypothesize that his choices are guided by dependence
upon the notion that the FDA, or the author of such a drug availability
decision, should pursue a simple unitary value and not resolve competing
norms.
Another departure Korman cites was the FDA's selection of mem-
bers for the Advisory Committee. Rather than leaving it to frontline staff,
the Commissioner's staff directly circulated names, allegedly to achieve
226. HUTT ET AL., supra note 155, at 1013 ("FDA's use of advisory committees in the review
of NDAs, BLAs, and food additive petitions is entirely discretionary . . . ." (quoting Peter Barton
Hutt, The Regulation ofDrug Products by the United States Food and Drug Administration, in THE
TEXTBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE (John P. Griffin & John O'Grady eds., 5th ed. 2006))).
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 918,
121 Stat. 823, 960-61, recently added FDCA § 505(s), which only requires advisory committees for
new chemical entities, and even then, the FDA can waive the requirement in action letter explaining
why it did not do so. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(s), 21 U.S.C. § 355(s) (2012);




227. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
228. Noah, supra note 203, at 360-61.
229. Cathryn Jakobson Ramin, Why Did the F.D.A. Approve a New Pain Drug?, NEW YORKER
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-did-the-f-d-a-approve-a-new-
pain-drug (discussing Zohydro ER, approved despite the advisory committee's opposition due to a
lack of substance abuse deterrence); see also DIANA M. ZUCKERMAN, NATIONAL RESEARCH
CENTER FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEES: DOES APPROVAL MEAN SAFETY?
(2006), http://center4research.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/FDA-Report-v7.pdf ("The
FDA also approved four (36%) of the 11 drugs that the drug advisory committees voted against,
including products that were opposed by almost all the committee members. . . . [C]lose to half
(43%) of the devices that were not recommended for approval obtained FDA approval anyway.").
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"balance of opinion."230 Though this procedural anomaly did not ulti-
mately affect the decision of the advisory committee, the clash between
health science criteria and other considerations is what Korman high-
lights as the problematic "departure."231 Yet, balance is a statutorily in-
scribed consideration. The FDCA requires drug and device advisory
committees to contain diverse perspectives.232
The level of decision-making, not just for the advisory committee
selection, but also the OTC decision itself, troubled Korman. The line
staff, such as the office directors within CDER, were "normally" the
ones to make the decisions, but in this instance, Korman noted the in-
volvement of the CDER Director, the Commissioner's participation,
even the role of the White House, which served as a channel for the in-
troduction of these external considerations.23 3 However, the level of deci-
sion-maker was nowhere prescribed as the Office Director level, and key
"Decisional Meeting[s]" have often included the CDER Director.234 It is
only since then that the statute has been modified by Congress to specify
the "Division Director and Office Director's decision document" and
command that "scientific review of an application is considered the work
of the reviewer and shall not be altered by management or the reviewer
once final."235 Prior to 2007, the statute designated the decision to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), while the Secretary had
in writing delegated to the Commissioner.23 6 And because this was a li-
censing decision, the Administrative Procedure Act imposes fewer re-
strictions on the agency's choice of decision-maker.2 37
Evidence that these external considerations affected the timing of
the decision was a third departure. There was deposition testimony that
on January 15, 2004, the Commissioner expressed the view that the FDA
would issue a non-approvable letter because of the insufficiency of data
for those under sixteen, an insufficiency that was not likely to be ad-
dressed soon.2 38 However, the formal office-level reviews would not be
230. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
231. Id. at 527-28.
232. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 505(n)(3)(B)-{C), 513(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. §§
355(n)(3)(B)-(C), 360c(b)(2) (2012) (requiring "diversified expertise" and consumer viewpoints);
see also id. § 360e(g)(2)(B) (requiring "diversified professional backgrounds").
233. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 546-47.
234. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY:
IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA'S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 32
(2006).
235. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(l)(2)(C)(v), (D), 21 U.S.C. §
355(l)(2)(C)(v), (D) (2012), amended by Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 916 (3), 121 Stat. 823, 958-59.
236. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino ll), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing 21
U.S.C. § 393(d)(2) (2006), amended by Tobacco Regulation, Federal Retirement Reform, Pub. L.
No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009); Delegations ofAuthority to the Commissioner Food and Drugs,
in FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDE § 1410.10 (2005).
237. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 557(b), 554(d)(2)(A). Alternatively, it was a
petition for rulemaking, with no particular APA-defined decision maker.
238. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
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completed until April of that year, after which a non-approvable letter
was accordingly issued in May.239 Thus, the U.S. Government Accounta-
bility Office (GAO) and others never found conclusive evidence that
earlier statements by agency superiors constituted premature decision,
240rather than an exchange of provisional views.
And the most crucial departure-the one at the crux of whether an
internal health reason could justify the other departures, or whether the
decision was motivated by "bad faith" external reasons-was the FDA's
reluctance to extrapolate adult clinical data to the adolescent population
despite previous instances of extrapolation to pediatric subpopulations.
The outcomes of the actual use study (AUS) in particular showed that at
least for the population enrolled in the AUS, the "frequency of unpro-
tected sex did not increase, condom use did not decrease, and the overall
use of effective contraception did not decrease [with use of plan B]." 241
The AUS results formed the fulcrum of the case because the design
of the AUS study producing these results lacked significant inclusion of
younger girls in the adolescent age range. Twenty-nine of the 585 re-
cruited subjects were aged fourteen to sixteen, and none were younger
than fourteen, giving the FDA Commissioner oom to declare that he was
"not convinced the studies had enough power to determine if there were
behavioral differences between adults and adolescents."242 The sponsor
supplemented its own study with existing literature that also looked at
243the behavioral effects of emergency contraception. Yet, the numbers
were still low, particularly for those in the younger adolescent range.
Therefore, the CDER Acting Director concluded that the failure for any
differences to show up with such low numbers did not conclusively
counter the worry that it is generally "'very difficult to extrapolate data
on behavior from older ages to younger ages' because of the diminished
capacity of adolescents to make rational decisions and the 'large devel-
opmental differences,' between [younger and older adolescents]."244 He
signed the non-approvable letter and maintained that "although he 'con-
sulted with the Office of the Commissioner,' he himself 'made the deci-
sion,' on the basis of the scientific data."245
239. Id at 531-32.
240. See Heinzerling, supra note 125, at 951 (discussing how the GAO REPORT, supra note
161, at 21-22, found conflicting evidence on this matter).
241. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (alteration in original) (quoting FDA Commissioner
McClellan).
242. Id at 528, 531, 547 (quoting FDA Commissioner McClellan).
243. Id at 528.
244. Id at 533 (quoting Dr. Galson, Acting Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research).
245. Robert Steinbrook, Waiting for Plan B-The FDA and Nonprescription Use of Emergency
Contraception, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2327, 2327 (2004) (quoting Dr. Galson, Acting Director of
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research).
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Korman pointed to the underlying refusal to extrapolate as an unjus-
tified departure from a "long history" of generalizing data from older
women to younger women for other contraceptives.24
But even Korman concedes that non-extrapolation is the shakiest
ground upon which to stake a claim that the FDA's departure from past
practice rendered its decision improper. Understandably, a judge would
have qualms deciding that biomedical science requires inference to an
under-sampled subpopulation. He allows that "[w]hile it may have been
rational for the FDA to consider adolescent cognitive development i  its
evaluation of Plan B as an OTC drug, plaintiffs have presented unrebut-
ted evidence that the FDA's focus on these behavioral concerns stemmed
from political . . . rather than permissible health and safety concerns."24 7
Korman chooses to use this deviations analysis in a way that high-
lights his doctrinal focus on the agency's consideration of competing
values as the central ground for rebuffing the FDA's explanation. It is
notable that he does not invoke something like the Accardi doctrine,
which holds agencies to the rules or principles they set forth themselves,
even if those policies are not statutorily required.248 Perhaps none of the
"policies or practices" he cites rise to the threshold of clarity and con-
sistency needed to bite with the force of law, though they are still back-
ground conditions that are relevant for substantive review for reasona-
bleness and non-arbitrariness. But if they had risen to such a threshold,
then the departures would be improper in and of themselves, rather than
because they signal an improper consideration.
Instead, the purpose for Korman of tallying these departures is that
any deviation from past practice suggests that something potentially "ar-
bitrary" and unreasonable has entered unless uch outlier action is justi-
fied by internal or statutorily permissible reasons, "supply[ing] a rea-
soned analysis" required by Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association
of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Compa-
ny.249 The defendants do in fact try to justify the deviations on that
ground, saying that the key substantive considerations are the distinctive
health concerns and the lack of data on those health concerns as affected
by emergency contraception use in younger girls and women. As the lack
of such data cannot be conclusively overcome by extrapolating the sci-
ence from the older adults, the appropriateness of extrapolation becomes
the decisive issue for whether deviations can be justified or not.
246. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
247. Id. at 548.
248. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1954).




Thus, as with the soda ban, the line of scrimmage was whether the
exception had an internal or external justification. Suggesting that the
decision and its unique features were a response to the product's particu-
lar public health implications, an internal concern, would have then al-
lowed the agency decision to stand. Such a position would have elimi-
nated value clash.
How were these behavioral concerns for the adolescent population
styled as internal justifications? At the outset of the FDA's process in
April 2001, during review of the citizen petition, the Office of Drug
Evaluation in CDER first reviewed and identified the concerns relating to
younger women as follows:
* Whether availability of Plan B would crowd-out use of "more ef-
fective forms of birth control"250
* adolescents' comprehension of Plan B 251
* the effect on adolescent girls' willingness to use condoms, testing,
and other means of protecting against sexually transmitted diseases
(STD's)252
Under this rubric, the concerns which arguably justified the carve-
out for young women were not "pro-life" concerns or sexual morality
concerns. The FDA framed these concerns as motivated by the underly-
ing health concern over safety and contraceptive effectiveness and
whether those policies should be differentially weighed for younger
women and girls. These are paradigmatic "substitute risks" or "health-
health tradeoffs," which Sunstein claims agencies are permitted to bal-
ance unless Congress has clearly said otherwise.253 Cast this way, the
defeasibility of the underlying health protection purpose of Plan B avail-
ability would be based not upon a competing norm but a judgment inter-
nal to the justification underlying prescription requirements for drugs.
However, the judge rejected this framing and described the con-
cerns about the potentially different behavioral effects on younger wom-
en and girls, not strictly speaking as health concerns, but as concerns
about promiscuity.254
250. Tummino I, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 526, 533.
253. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1668, 1672-73.
254. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 533-34 (quoting an office-level director saying these
concerns "are 'more applicable to the ability of adolescents to make reasoned decisions about engag-
ing in sexual intercourse, not their ability to understand how to use Plan B safely and effectively as
an emergency contraceptive should they engage in unprotected sexual intercourse"' (quoting Dr.
Jenkins, Director of the Office of New Drugs)).
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To dismiss the FDA's protests that their concerns were indeed
health and safety-related, Korman again cited the AUS study results
showing no change in unprotected sex or use of effective contracep-
255tion. Yet this response amounts to a non sequitur, as the low numbers
of young adolescent subjects in the AUS study arguably offered no evi-
dence either way for behavioral effects in that group.256
Thus, Korman concludes that the age-related line drawing was not
justified by health reasons, but orthogonal aims, the consideration of
which the judge deemed extraneous, political, and presumptively "bad
faith," rendering the government's action arbitrary.
6. Assigns to Non-Legal Sphere
In contrast to the court's preference regarding NYC's soda portion
cap, deferring to political decision-making is not Korman's favored an-
swer. Indeed, Korman says the decision was illegitimate because the
confirmation process politically influenced it.
Korman deplores the pressure that confirmation imposes on the
FDA's Plan B actions. Is the FDA's decision therefore too political?
Why isn't the erection of guidelines for the exercise of agency discretion
by means of the confrontation of the President's politics with Congress's
politics just exactly the degree of political that we intended?257 Indeed,
had confirmation not provided a channel for Senate pressure, the FDA
might have withheld even a partial OTC grant, and the morality consid-
erations would have prevailed utterly over health interests.
Two confirmation fights and a new Administration later, the FDA
was still offering only an incrementally modified age-restricted OTC
grant. With these extended battles achieving hard-won accommodations,
and both political parties arriving at the same age-restricted approach, it
seems quite plausible that the result represented some sort of political
equipoise. The outcome was politically validated, even if not fully satis-
fying to any one side. Yet Korman would banish political accountability
for agency decision-making.
What alternate arena does he imagine? Would he prefer that such
decisions reflect private ordering, namely, the market? But market order-
ing entails the pure positivism of allowing the "indicated use" to be de-
fined by the sponsor. Allowing sponsors to draw those lines is consistent
with allowing the valuation of health versus other interests to be deter-
mined by the market. Thus, the age limitation would have prevailed had
the sponsor decided to frame its SNDA application for OTC switch for
255. Id. at 532.
256. See id.
257. The courts recognize that agencies exist in a matrix of political accountability. See, e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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an "age-restricted indication." Throughout the litigation, the government
elected, sometimes to the limit of credulity, to present the age limitations
not as conditions required by the government but as a request by the
sponsor in their SNDA. 258 Even in the government's final hail-Mary at-
tempt to stay the second invalidation granting the citizen petition, it did
so by trying to grant an alternative approval to the drug sponsor's new
SNDA on One-Step, limited to women and girls age fifteen and older.259
Korman, however, scorns the market logic of coping with the value
clash in this way, at least insofar as it would implicate the FDA as a
handmaiden.260 If market incentives determined the availability of the
drug, then the sponsor, through its age-restricted proposal, would earn
market exclusivity for its research.261 Korman denies any obligation to
honor this incentive, calling this arrangement "a sweetheart agreement
with the FDA." 262
Instead, Korman's favored alternate arena is science. His discussion
of the advisory board assumes scientific expertise, not diverse perspec-
263tives, as the requirement. 2 When he identifies the gravamen of the
complaint against the FDA, he cites departure from scientifically-based
review.264 Korman approvingly cites the Pendergast Declaration, an ami-
cus brief of sorts from a former FDA employee that stipulates the charac-
ter of the FDA as "an expert scientific agency charged with making sci-
entific and medical decisions within the boundaries set by the FDCA.
Nothing in that statute suggests that scientific decisions may bend to
political winds."265 These assertions about the "character" of the FDA are
presumed, rather than argued, from specific statutory text.266
258. See Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
259. See Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino III), No. 12-CV-763, 2013 WL 2631163, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013).
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 198, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). The coda to this tussle
is that in the end, the FDA complied with the order by making Plan B One-Step, Teva's product,
available OTC, unrestricted by age, but continuing to age restrict OTC access to all other forms of
emergency contraception. Deborah Kotz, Teva Gets Exclusivity on Plan B Contraceptive, BOS.
GLOBE (July 24, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/07/23/fda-
grants-exclusivity-plan-one-step-emergency-contraceptive-for-three-
years/5ShlBCNplsJTGYzmkkr6MI/story.html. This exclusive arrangement was to last 3 years. Id.
263. Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 527-28.
264. See id. at 523.
265. Tummino v. Hamburg (Tummino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting
Declaration of Mary K. Pendergast, J.D., LL.M. in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Summary Judgment at 1 33, Tummino II, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No.
12-CV-763)).
266. Dworkin says of the referee in a chess game where Tal deploys a disconcerting smile:
The referee must select one or another of these conceptions, not to supplement the con-
vention but to enforce it. He must construct the game's character by putting to himself
different sets of questions. Given that chess is an intellectual game, is it, like poker, intel-
lectual in some sense that includes ability at psychological intimidation? Or is it, like
mathematics, intellectual in some sense that does not include that ability?
DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 103.
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7. Judge Arrogates the Decision and Methodology
Yet many layers conceal Korman's answer for who should decide
emergency contraception access. On the one hand, in making the drug
available OTC, the result of the case stands for the proposition that the
patient, not the doctor, should decide. At the same time, Korman declares
that the judgment of whether health concerns should accommodate reli-
gious and sexual morality is "political," which might imply that political
processes should decide the question. Yet he deplores the use of political
negotiation to decide these matters. By his lights, scientific experts
should control the outcome, but he is in a bind because by inserting him-
self, he necessarily conveys that judges, in reviewing administrative de-
cisions, should decide.2 67
Should Korman himself apply the scientific standards, or should he
enable the scientific decision-makers to do it? His choice of relief, reject-
ing remand, and ordering grant brings this vexed question to the fore.
And what governs the judge's application of scientific standards? Kor-
man attempts to sidestep these difficulties by proceeding as if he is en-
gaged in methodologically familiar rule-based decision-making to con-
clude that science precluded the agency's decision.268
But to determine that the agency's decision was incompatible with
science, he must define what science would require and in some sense
perform his own scientific analysis.2 69 Indeed, one plaintiffs lawyer not-
ed that the judge "d[id] his own research . . . on scientific details in the
case."270 The pretense that rules are enough to decide is unconvincing.
Each "prior policy or practice" that he attempts to extend to this
case turns out to fall short of a rule that would decide the case without
doubling back to check the agency's work in performing the underlying
"scientific" decision-making process. Rules, as we discussed before,
distinctively apply pressure independently of their own justification.
Something short of a rule will thus be inconclusive on the application of
such prior treatment to this particular case with its particular circum-
stances, leaving Korman no choice but to take some position on the un-
derlying scientific support for inference from adult to adolescent popula-
tions.
267. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 12,
Tummino I, 2013 WL 2631163 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013) (No. 12-CV-763) (voicing this very
concern about the relief of granting the petition, in Korman's April 5, 2013, order invalidating the
Obama Administration's age-restriction, the government argued that the public and the brand of
FDA will be irreparably harmed "if a drug product that purported to be 'FDA approved' were ap-
proved instead at the direction of a court.").
268. See Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
269. See Pam Belluck, Behind Scolding of the F.D.A., a Complex and Gentle Judge, N.Y.





The FDA is not bound to the recommendation of advisory commit-
tees.271 The selection of advisory committee members to represent differ-
ent perspectives was not foreclosed by rule.272 The timing of the decision
was not conclusively prior to the scientific review, and the level of deci-
sion-maker was hardly clearly and irrevocably prescribed.
Fidelity to "rule-based" decision-making should lead courts to en-
courage and honor rules of high formal realizability, precisely the kind
that contain articulated ex ante exceptions.2 73 This approach is at odds
with how Korman rules. The outcome he reaches instead represents a
view that the rule is sufficient to decide only when backed by health sci-
ence, when congruent with what Korman has constructed as the underly-
ing purpose. The naked rule is too vulnerable.
The reasoning that he employs is less an analysis of rules, but rather
a simulation of scientific analysis instead. In the central deviations analy-
sis, it turns out he spends much of his time arguing about whether statis-
tical findings can be extrapolated from one population to another and
why inferences about a younger population can justifiably be drawn from
data describing an older population.27 4 The defendants point out devel-
opmental differences in younger adolescents and present information
showing that they do not always extrapolate drug efficacy to pediatric
populations from adult data ("in 82.5% of the drug products" 275). 2 76 The
factors that affect the appropriateness of extrapolation are manifold. Just
in this action alone, the FDA mentions the number of younger patients
enrolled;27 7 other sampling features, such as whether the study enrolled
subjects in a setting or manner "that would be expected to capture a rep-
resentative population of women who [are potential users];"278 the num-
ber of potential individuals to be expected in the younger age group;279
271. See discussion supra Section III.B.5.ii.b.
272. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
273. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1687-88 (1976) (identifying this feature of certain rules which makes them specific and de-
terminate as compared to standards). The portrait I paint here departs in ascribing valences to rules
as opposed to standards. Adhering to rules here can be "pro-health." More open-textured, policy-
inflected Dworkinian decision making can turn out to be "individualistic," in the case of the soda
portion cap case, or result in less "mutual support," as in the eyeglasses benefits.
274. Korman states that the defendants' position "centers on the argument that the FDA has no
set policy of extrapolating data from adults to pediatric populations." Tummino v. Hamburg (Tum-
mino II), 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Later, he states, "The FDA's failure to extrapo-
late involves ... perhaps the most significant unexplained deviation from FDA practice ordered by
the Secretary." Id. at 175.
275. Id. at 176.
276. Tummino v. Torti (Tummino 1), 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
277. Id. at 531 (explaining that FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan said he was "not con-
vinced the studies had enough power to determine if there were behavioral differences between
adults and adolescents").
278. Tummino II, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dr. John K. Jenkins,
Director of the Office of New Drugs).
279. Id (explaining that the Acting Director of the Division of Pediatric Drug Development
stated that the minimal number of individuals of pediatric age potentially using a drug could justify
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the particular physiological or other differences implicated by the drug
mechanism; differing metabolism; different surface-to-mass ratio; devel-
oping organs; different growth or nutritional requirements;28 0 and differ-
ent cognitive development.28 1
Should the norms governing justifiable inference given the data
sampling constraints operate like legal norms, which may require more
presumptive consistency? Is Korman, in appealing to past extrapolation
and inference, piggybacking on scientific practice norms, or adhering to
a legal rule requiring generalization? 282
Korman argues that none of the FDA's past refusals to extrapolate
to the pediatric population involved safety data, only efficacy findings.2 83
He reasons that because the determination of OTC status for Plan B for
adolescents involved consideration of whether the safety, as well as effi-
cacy, of Plan B for adults could be assumed to obtain in children, the past
history of extrapolating safety data justifies extrapolation here.284 In per-
forming his extrapolation analysis by looking to whether the FDA has
deviated from its historical practices in extrapolation, he does a fair
amount of violence to scientific reasoning. The FDA's protests capture
this well when it says, "Notwithstanding all of these departures, the FDA
argues that here is no customary agency practice and '[e]very drug pre-
sents a unique collection of issues, and no two reviews will be identi-
cal."'
285
Levonorgestrel is remarkably well-tolerated, has been in long-
standing use, and adverse reactions have been minor and few.2 86 Thus,
the findings of Plan B studies may well be generalizable, even to popula-
tions that are not well-sampled. However, it is hard to imagine that judg-
es who do not know much about the differences in physiology and drug
action among different populations are the ones to best correctly identify
the data and study features that would justify extrapolation. Why would
Korman know whether information about a drug's safety rather than
findings about its efficacy were more likely to be similar between adult
and pediatric subpopulations? Why should we trust his judgment that
extrapolation to adolescent populations for previous products, without
waiving the requirement of an additional pharmacokinetic or safety study in a pediatric population,
consistent with the criteria outlined in the Pediatric Research Equity Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(4)).
280. Id. at 173 (citing the FDA's prior decision to label an OTC diet drug, Alli, as "not ... for
use by the pediatric population" because of nutritional concerns).
281. See Memorandum from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. to Margaret
Hamburg, Comm'r of Food & Drugs (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file with author).
282. See Tummino 1, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 532-33 (asserting FDA's long history of extrapolating
from adults).
283. Tummino II, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76.
284. Id.
285. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plantiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion to Strike at 32, Turn-
mino v. Eschenbach, No. 05-CV-366 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 2007)).
286. Id at 166-68.
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regard to behavioral implications, should entail such extrapolation to
adolescents for oral postintercourse levonorgestrel? Surely different is-
sues can arise in different products.
C. White v. Beal: Medicaid Eyeglasses Coverage Restrictions
Pennsylvania, under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (SSA),
administers a Medicaid program, jointly funded by the federal and state
governments to provide health benefits for certain populations in need of
287a medical safety net. Title XIX requires any Medicaid program quali-
fying for federal matching funds to provide certain mandatory benefits,
such as inpatient hospital care, or nursing, but then allows states-at the
same federal match rate-to add certain optional benefits, including eye-
glasses.288 Pennsylvania decided to furnish glasses, but not for patients
with refractive error, such as near-sightedness or far-sightedness.289 The
eligible patients were those whose need for glasses stemmed from an eye
disease.290 The state's failure to provide the optional benefit to those with
refractive error, when they had no obligation to provide the benefit at all,
was deemed to violate the Medicaid statute's requirement of reasonable-
291ness.
1. Medicaid Coverage Background
Medicaid is a joint state and federal program to cover specified
populations considered in need of a safety net.292 States are not required
to establish a program following federal standards for Medicaid, but if
they do so, the federal government will provide them with matching
funds for such expenditures.293 Federal standards include the coverage of
certain mandatory beneficiary categories and certain mandatory benefits,
as well as some crosscutting general standards.29 4 Medicaid features an
approach whereby federal guidelines set a baseline for what a state pro-
gram must cover to qualify as a Medicaid program.295 Failure to reach
the minimum standards will cause the state to lose matching funds, but
states have considerable freedom in the other direction. They are permit-
ted to go beyond the minimum required and layer more generous eligibil-
ity or benefits on top of the federally required floor. The provision of this
287. Social Security Act (SSA) § 1901, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012).
288. See discussion infra Section Ill.C.ii.
289. White v. Beal, 555 F.2d 1146, 1148 (3rd Cir. 1977).
290. Id.
291. Id at 1151-52.
292. ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK 4 (2002),
http://kff.org/medicaid/report/the-medicaid-resource-book/.
293. Social Security Act § 1903, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2012).
294. See discussion infra Section Ill.C.ii-iii.
295. Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medi-
caid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 419-20 (2008).
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optional assistance garners federal matching funds if it falls within the
parameters of general Medicaid requirements.296
i. Eligibility
Eligibility for Medicaid had historically been tethered to the old Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) categories of the "deserving poor."2 97 Under this paradigm,
mere poverty was insufficient to qualify; the program was targeted to
298beneficiaries who had "reason" to be poor. In addition to meeting cer-
tain means-tests, one also had to fall into one of the eligibility "catego-
ries," such as single mothers (now single parents) and their dependent
children, pregnant women, the aged, blind, and disabled.2 99 For states to
receive federal funds, they were required to cover specified low-income
individuals in these categories.
Beyond these mandatory groups, states had the option to cover cer-
tain additional individuals, including those who were somewhat less in-
digent, but because of high medical expenses, still lacked resources for
adequate medical care.3o1
ii. Benefits
The statutory benefits standards were also structured as a mandatory
baseline with a state option to provide more.30 2 Mandatory benefits in-
cluded family planning services, inpatient hospital care, outpatient hospi-
tal services, laboratory and x-ray services, and physician and nurse prac-
303
titioner services.
Other items and services, such as vision, dental, and prescription
drugs, were designated as optional.m
Just as drug indications are not susceptible to unidimensional defini-
tion, benefits can be configured along various parameters. A number of
296. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 292, at 95.
297. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC
HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 73 (2003); David A. Super, Laborato-
ries of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure ofAntipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 541, 585-86 (2008).
298. See Super, supra note 297, at 585.
299. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431,438-39 (2011).
300. Social Security Act § 1902, 42 U.S.C. §l396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2012).
301. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f)(2)(B).
302. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) ("A State plan for medical assistance must ... provide. . .
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17), (21), (28).
303. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17), (21), (28); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A).
304. See 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a) (excluding those services itemized in § 1396d(a)(10)(A) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a))). A number of developments have modified this framework. Now, Medicaid
is delivered largely by managed care companies, and Congress has also reduced benefit requirements
to benchmark or benchmark-equivalent coverage for children, working parents, and pregnant women
above 133% of the federal poverty line. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171,
§ 6044 , 120 Stat. 4, 88-93 (2006) (codified as amended at Social Security Act § 1937, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396u-7 (2012) (defining benchmark coverage based on certain commercial plans in the state)).
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options exist for reducing benefits. Benefits could come with large co-
305
pays. 3 Availability could be restricted to only a limited number of pro-
viders.3 06 Home and community-based care could be made available for
only those patients meeting certain diagnostic criteria for need.307 Hospi-
tal days might be capped.30 s Prescription drugs might be restricted to
those on a formulary.30
iii. Crosscutting Standards
Federal statute also imposes a few general crosscutting require-
ments upon state programs.3 Title XIX contains a so-called equal ac-
cess standard that stipulates that states must provide resources "sufficient
to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under
the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to
the general population in the geographic area." I The so-called compa-
rability standard derives from language that requires the provision of an
equal "amount, duration, or scope" of medical assistance to any other
individual in that category.3 12
The statute contains a number of other such standards,3 " but at is-
sue in White v. Beal3 14 was the "reasonable[ness]" requirement imposed
by the statutory language that "[a] State plan for medical assistance must
... include reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and
the extent of medical assistance under the plan which . . . are consistent
with the objectives of this [Act]." 315
The zone of state flexibility has been described thus: "[T]his court
recognized the state's broad discretion to define the medical conditions
for which treatment is 'necessary' within the meaning of the Act," but
this broad discretion is not unbridled.3 16 Indeed, it is bounded by the fair-
305. See, e.g., Claus v. Smith, 519 F. Supp. 829, 831 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(1).
307. See generally Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community
Care: Lessons From Medicaid's History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 961, 963-65 (2010) (providing
background into availability of community-based care under Medicaid).
308. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 306 (1985).
309. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4)(C).
310. For general discussion, see Huberfeld, supra note 295, at 418-24.
311. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)-(C)(i).
313. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1) (requiring state medical assistance plans to be offered
statewide).
314. 555 F.2d 1146 (3rd Cir. 1977).
315. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). For managed care, 42 U.S.C. §1396b(i)(26) requires necessary,
reasonable limits. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19). Note that advocates sometimes wam against
sourcing these standards for reasonableness in amount, duration, and scope to particular statutory
provisions rather than to more diffuse federal common law. See Stan Dom et al., Marimizing Cover-
age for Medicaid Clients ("Bridges over Troubled Waters"), 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 411, 412 &
n.11 (1986) (regarding case law that "relied on 42 U.S.C. §[ ] ... 1396a(10)(C)(i), and 45 C.F.R.
§ 249.10(a)(5)(i), now 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d)").
316. White v. Beal (White II), 555 F.2d 1146, 1150 (3d Cir. 1977). 1 am grateful to Nan Hunter
for pointing me to this case.
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ly open-textured, non-specific norms articulated above, such as "reason-
ableness," "equal access," and "comparability."3 17
What we explore in White is the curious and arguably "extra-legal"
way by which courts choose to give content to those norms.
2. Exception
The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare added eyeglasses,
clearly an optional benefit, to its Medicaid program. 3 But state law re-
stricted the extent of coverage provided: if the need for eyeglasses
stemmed from an eye disease, Medicaid would cover it, but not if the
need stemmed from refraction error, such as myopia.319
The court declared this exception unreasonable under the Medicaid
statute, which it read to prohibit the restriction of service based on mat-
ters other than "medical need."320 The court opined that the benefit of
federal matching funds comes with a corresponding constraint to scale
the benefit in accordance with the federal purpose of addressing "need":
We conclude that when a state decides to distribute a service as part
of its participation in Title XIX, its discretion to decide how the ser-
vice shall be distributed, while broad, is not unfettered: the service
must be distributed in a manner which bears a rational relationship to
the underlying federal purpose of providing the service to those in
greatest need of it. 321
Leaving aside whether the concept of "need," even "medical need,"
is sufficiently well-specified to settle concrete disputes over plan design,
the court seems to understand the single purpose that governs the pro-
gram as no mere social policy goal to be fulfilled to the extent possible
but without requirement of consistency.322 Instead, the court applies
"need fulfillment" as a Dworkinian social principle, which furnishes an
individualized claim: "By permitting the state plans to provide only part
of the cost, the statute must be construed to envision an evenhanded shar-
ing of benefits and burdens among those having the same needs."3 23 Even
if this principle of evenhandedness for those with the "same needs" were
self-evident from the Medicaid statute, the identification of the relevant
dimension in which needs would be considered "same" or "different" is
317. See Huberfeld, supra note 299, at 446.
318. White II, 555 F.2d at 1148. Eyeglasses, however, would not be optional for children who
enjoy mandatory Early Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSDT) benefits under 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(A).
319. White II, 555 F.2d at 1148 & n.I.
320. Id.atll51.
321. Id.
322. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 91 (describing such a goal as a "nonindividuated political
aim").
323. White II, 555 F.2d at 1151.
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so underdetermined as to be empty.324 "This is so because any set of hu-
man beings will resemble each other in some respects and differ from
each other in others and, until it is established what resemblance and
differences are relevant," the principle of equal treatment for sameness
cannot be determinate.325 In fact, the parameter of the relevant medical
condition along which states are obliged to provide "necessary" treat-
ment evenhandedly proved highly manipulable: "[T]he state argues that
it chose to treat the 'condition of eye disease' and not refractive
error" while the court, agreeing with the beneficiary plaintiff "on the
other hand contends the 'condition' is visual impairment."326
Does the Medicaid statute tell us, by virtue of the availability of
federal financing, that exclusions, or distinctions, can only take a certain
shape? Is it inherent in the legal requirement of "reasonableness" that a
determination should be based on need as determined "medically" rather
than "politically"? Where do these ideas come from?
Ironically, the rejection of political need for "principled" medical
need was delinked from any corresponding requirement that the state
actually meet patients' medical needs. Indeed, the coda was not a happy
one for the plaintiff. The result of the court ruling requiring Pennsylvania
to provide eyeglasses more broadly was that Pennsylvania found eye-
glasses would therefore be unaffordable and withdrew the benefit alto-
gether.327
This case forced the state into an all-or-nothing choice. This case
would not expose the exceptions problem in such stark relief were eye-
glasses a mandatory benefit. But the state is not required to provide them
at all, so how can it be required to provide them to both those with eye
disease and those with refractive error? For the court to read the word
"reasonable" to block a state's politically accountable determination of
the extent to which it wishes to provide "extra" assistance to their Medi-
caid population is striking.32 8 What then is at work?
324. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 560 (1982).
325. HART, supra note 7, at 155.
326. White II, 555 F.2d at 1150-51.
327. White v. Beal (White ill), 447 F. Supp. 788, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
328. This case is not entirely idiosyncratic, but part of a line of precedent where medical need
is privileged and used by courts to invalidate state attempts to cut back Medicaid benefits. See, e.g.,
Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 511-12 (8th Cir. 2006) (invalidating state's decision to provide
partial DME, an optional benefit, to only certain categorical populations); Weaver v. Reagen, 886
F.2d 194, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding state's decision to limit HIV drugs violates Medicaid);
Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 548-49 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding Iowa's exclusion of sex reas-
signment surgery was unreasonable when it was the only available medical treatment for relief of
patient's condition); Phila. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1979)
(finding mandatory EPSTD benefits include orthodontia if medically necessary); Preterm, Inc. v.
Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 126-27 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding it inconsistent with Medicaid statute for a
state to limit physician's medical judgment by prohibiting medically necessary abortions except
those required to save pregnant woman's life, though superseded by Congress's action in adopting




As with the soda portion cap and the Plan B OTC switch, what
seems to be at work is an invalidation of rules when they have, through
their exceptions, accommodated conflicting values.32 9 The court here
forbids the tailoring of a benefit rule to strike a balance between cost and
health need.330
Cost was behind the state's rationale for the exclusion of patients
with refractive error.331 Cost limits forced prioritization, and the state
prioritized according to a social norm constructing the "normal" as op-
posed to "pathological," a norm that, as we will see, runs somewhat
aslant to the "medical necessity" norm. The state claimed that it was
simply trying to allocate limited resources and, therefore, "restrict pay-
ment for eyeglasses to those individuals it considers most in need of aid,
those having pathology or disease of the eye."332 The state articulated its
criterion of need thus: "[R]ecipients whose eye pathology could be treat-
ed or cured by providing glasses were the most immediately needy group
of recipients."
But the court rejects this type of underinclusion: "[W]e do not be-
lieve that the state has applied a permissible method of obtaining econo-
mies in its administration of the medical assistance program."334 Through
this particular benefit rule configuration, the state has improperly as-
sumed the prioritization of competing values.
4. Assigns to a Non-Legal Sphere: Medical Necessity
The court proposes a different prioritization instead-by the norms
of medical practice. "Assuming that medical need is a valid measurement
of eligibility, the state's factual premise [that they have served the needi-
limits on hospital stays consistent with the Rehabilitation Act declaring, "Medicaid programs do not
guarantee that each recipient will receive that level of health care precisely tailored to his or her
particular needs"). But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (holding that Connecticut can
define the procedural hurdles for first trimester abortions to be determined "medically necessary");
Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Arizona can choose to
cover only autologous, and not allogeneic bone marrow transplants given lack of facilities); Smith v.
Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 760-61 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding Iowa's exclusion of gender reassignment
surgery not arbitrary if done by rulemaking and if professionals disagree on the necessity); Curtis v.
Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 648 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding
caps on physician visits per month); Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97, 108 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (find-
ing the state can consider cost in imposing drug formularies, as long as prior authorization process is
adequate).
329. See supra Sections III.A.4, III.B.5.
330. White 11, 555 F.2d at 1150.
331. Id. (describing the state's explanation: "First, the Commonwealth was not and is not ready
to provide the large amounts of money necessary to provide glasses to every recipient needing them
'to aid or improve vision."' (quoting White v. Beal (White 1), 413 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (E.D. Pa.
1976))).
332. Id. at 1149.
333. White v. Beal (White 1), 413 F. Supp. 1141, 1149-50 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
334. White II, 555 F.2d at 1149.
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est of the group], is not supported by the record."33 5 The court goes on to
cite affidavits from two ophthalmologists declaring that sometimes peo-
ple with refractive error may be "more visually handicapped than those
who have a disease of the eye."336
Rather than relying on state law, the court apparently prefers the
concept of "medical need," citing the authority of individual clinicians to
determine the degree of "medical necessity."337
We must therefore examine the concept of medical necessity and,
once it enters into the picture, how it functions as a standard for the
scope of benefits.
"Medically necessary care" is the "almost-universal contractual
standard for [health insurance] coverage."338 According to Mark Hall's
empirical findings, the specificity of the insurance contract has no signif-
icant effect on whether a patient can obtain coverage in legal disputes,
leaving this placeholder term, "medical necessity" to do most of the work
of demarcating what is covered under the plan.339 When interpreting
medical necessity, courts and legislatures do not rest determination of the
standard solely with the agency or insurer providing coverage.34 0 They
preserve enormous latitude for physicians to determine its application.
This latitude does not mean determination by the treating physician, but
rather determination by professional clinical standards,341 a second-order
analysis of what treating physicians ought to do.
The term "medical necessity" is not explicit in the Medicaid statute,
but has become judicially accepted as implicit to the legislative scheme
and is apparently endorsed by the Supreme Court.342 Indeed, White repre-
sents a crucial early step in that process.
The courts are not alone in reading "reasonable" to imply "medical-
ly necessary." HHS states that benefits: "[M]ust be sufficient in amount,
duration, and scope to reasonably achieve [their] purpose." With respect
to the required services for the "categorically needy" and the "medically
needy" the State "may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, dura-
335. Id. at 1150.
336. Id.
337. Id at 1150-51 ("The plaintiffs submitted the affidavits of two qualified ophthalmologists
stating that some persons with refractive error, but without eye pathology, may be far more visually
handicapped than those who have a disease of the eye. Moreover, the physicians maintain that, while
eyeglasses will correct a refractive error, they are not helpful in many cases of eye disease. The state
has not controverted these affidavits." (footnote omitted)).
338. M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 389, 413
(2009).
339. Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study
ofInsurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1055, 1062-63 (1996).
340. See id at 1063.
341. Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical Necessity" Determinations: A Continuing Healthcare
Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599, 619-20 (2004).
342. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444-45 & n.9 (1977).
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tion, or scope of' such services to an otherwise eligible individual "sole-
ly because of the diagnosis, type of illness or condition. . . .
[A]ppropriate limits [may be placed on] a service based on such criteria
as medical necessity or [those contained in] utilization [or medical re-
view procedures]."34 3
What does medically necessary mean, and how is the medical ne-
cessity determination made? In short, it involves significant deferral to
other decision-makers, namely, to the social and institutional practice of
clinical medicine. Under "medical necessity," coverage determinations
depend on more than the policy terms in the contract or statute; they also
involve a second query.344 This second step asks: "[E]ven if the contem-
plated care is a type generally covered, is its use medically reasonable
and necessary in this particular case and thus warranted?"345 The answer
to that question is determined by clinical standards, which in turn emerge
from the practice of medicine. Thus, the courts' turn toward medical
necessity to resolve the question of what to cover amid competing con-
cerns is a diversion of the question away from governance by rule to
another arena.
However, the concept of "medical necessity" does not determine its
own domain and by no means precludes rule-governance in its entirety.
The extent of coverage under public or private insurance has always in-
cluded two analytical steps, the first of which identifies which categories
of services are even eligible to be covered.34 6 Initially, one must ascertain
whether the plan covers surgically implanted artificial lenses, for in-
stance. Only then does the "medical necessity" step determine the cir-
cumstances and patient conditions for which those services are justi-
fied.347 For instance, just because lens implantation surgery is listed
among the benefits does not mean that insurance will cover such a sur-
gery if a patient simply wishes to correct her nearsightedness with an
intraocular lens, or if her cataract is so mild that it does not yet affect the
patient's vision and therefore does not yet justify the risks of surgery.
The Medicaid statute, like other health coverage schemes, lists
broad categories of services to be included in or expressly excluded from
benefits packages, while courts, through cases like White, have tasked
the specification of those benefits to determination by any individual
patient's clinician in accordance with her professional judgment.34 8 CoV-
erage decisions begin as a threshold matter by determining whether the
type of item or service is within the policy. If physical therapy services
343. Sufficiency of Amount, Duration, and Scope, 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2012).
344. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care is Medically Nec-




348. White v. Beal (White II), 555 F.2d 1146, 1150 (3d Cir. 1977).
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are not within the policy, then the inquiry would end there.3 49 But the
White court glosses over the two-step character of any coverage determi-
nation and thereby represents the clinical practice step of the medical
necessity inquiry as the only relevant inquiry.
The distinction between the listing of benefits and the determination
of medical necessity is unquestionably fuzzy. Jessica Mantel, in consid-
ering Medicaid's sister program Medicare, observes that "[flor example,
HHS may provide that a plan's prescription drug benefits must include
all drugs approved by the FDA . . . but not . . . drugs prescribed for the
treatment of erectile dysfunction or infertility." 3 50 While such a regula-
tion would not substitute for an individualized analysis of whether the
patient's condition warrants use of a drug, it could begin to impinge upon
such a determination, as the above example shows by allowing prescrip-
tion drugs for some conditions but not others. A similar inclusion of
therapies for some conditions and not others is arguably what Pennsylva-
nia proposed here.
Thus, medical necessity cannot determine its own governing juris-
diction. It admits of some boundaries set by positive law. But the court
aggressively redrew those boundaries.
5. Judge Arrogates Decision and Method
When the judge decides that medical necessity should govern, he is
displacing another decision-maker's choice.
So how does he decide when to substitute for another's choice? Is
there some legal rule distinguishing the first and second steps of the med-
ical necessity determination? Judge Weis shows no signs of declaring
such a rule. Instead, he appeals to medical norms and applies them in his
own fashion.351 Judge Weis, as we recall, "[a]ssum[es] that medical need
is a valid measurement of eligibility," 352 and he goes on to assess that
need based on two ophthalmologists' affidavits. The ophthalmologists
say that refractive error can be more visually handicapping and that
"[eyeglasses] are not helpful in many cases of eye disease."5 3 Yet Penn-
sylvania provides a long list of those eye diseases where glasses are help-
ful, such as with certain strabismuses, or asymmetries of vision, or condi-
tions associated with lens dysfunction.3 54 Is the judge really qualified to
sift through medical information, especially when provided in the form
349. See, e.g., DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1998) ("No matter how medically
necessary a thing may be to a particular person .. . the state need not (and in fact cannot) provide it
unless it falls within a covered medical service.").
350. Jessica Mantel, Setting National Coverage Standards for Health Plans Under Healthcare
Reform, 58 UCLA L. REV. 221, 229-30 (2010).
351. See White II, 555 F.2d at 1150; see also Hall et al., supra note 339.
352. White II, 555 F.2d at 1150.




of individual clinician affidavits, to aver that patients with divergent
squint or faulty lenses have less medical need?
In this case, neither the legally instantiated rule, nor the underlying
political prioritization, prevail; state legislatures and Medicaid agencies
are thus restricted in how they can weigh economic and other considera-
tions. Judges seem to harbor some underlying view that prompts them to
deflect situations where rules alone, unsupported by what they view as
the proper extralegal norms, claim to resolve value conflict.
One might respond that this case result needs no such cloak-and-
dagger account. In this case, the federal statute simply prohibits such a
benefit limitation. But is this conclusion unambiguously commanded by
the statute?355 An examination of the actual language reveals that the
most locally controlling statutory text concerning eyeglasses as a benefit,
does not prohibit the qualification of the benefit for economic considera-
tions.356 The court even concedes that "[s]ignificantly, the only statutory
restriction on furnishing eyeglasses is that they be prescribed by a physi-
cian or an optometrist."3 57 Unable to rest on the statutory language con-
cerning eyeglasses to impose its more stringent restriction, the court
points instead to the more distant crosscutting language that the state's
definition of benefits must be "reasonable."3 58 With such capacious terms
as "reasonable" defining the restriction on state legislatures, the argu-
ment that this result was compelled, rather than chosen by the court, fal-
ters.
Why can't the state prioritize what benefits to provide rather than
acceding to judge's preferences, clad in the fig leaf of medicine? Medi-
cine, the court seems to say, is the social institution robust enough to
manage this value conflict. Thus, it reroutes the matter away from set-
tlement by pedigreed legal rule, indeed away from the political process
of legitimating rules, and engages in its own ventriloquy of medical
norms to do so.
CONCLUSION
So far, I have identified a pattern-courts striking down exceptions
in health rules when those exceptions seek to accommodate value con-
flict and then assigning the matter to an extralegal, non-rule-governed
arena, all the while invoking non-rule like reasoning from that extralegal
realm to do so.
355. This case predates Chevron, US.A. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
356. Social Security Act § 1905(a)(xvii)(12), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xvii)(12) (2012)
("[P]rescribed drugs, dentures, and prosthetic devices; and eyeglasses prescribed by a physician
skilled in disease of the eye or by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select.").
357. White II, 555 F.2d at I150.
358. See id. at ll50-51.
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This pattern bespeaks a tendency in judicial reasoning to obscure
value conflict, even at the expense of a most potent tool in the legal sys-
tem's arsenal: rules. To strip rules of their ability to bind when even un-
derlying reasons run out is a major sacrifice, and is it worthwhile or nec-
essary to prop up an image of law as a realm of coherent, unitary princi-
ples? The premise of liberalism is the inevitability of disagreement.3 59
People will have different policy preferences. We can agree to disagree,
but we all agree to follow the rules. Why when we need clear dispositive
rules the most, as the instruments of equipoise amid disagreement, are
the judges loathe to allow them? Ex ante exceptions are a way to ac-
commodate and grease social change, reducing the costs of the new rule,
honoring the provisional, the plural, the incremental, acknowledging
competing values, and resisting a winner-take-all form of hubris. But
perhaps this tool is less available than we think.
Is the best we can hope for that law will offload these difficult set-
tlements onto other social institutions, even as jurists engage in shadow-
boxing versions of those alternate normative practices to manage the
jurisdictional decisions that are necessary to maintain these arrange-
ments?360
The courts in each of these cases insisted upon false unitary justifi-
cations, as though each rule should embody one principle. But justifica-
tion for any rule is compound. Health care is provided to the poor to the
extent financially sustainable. We allow patients direct market access to
a drug if the burden of prescription control is "unnecessary." We seek to
moderate unhealthful sugary drinks to the extent compatible with other
aspects of our lifestyle, including some measure of choice or hedonism.
Are health ends more fully respected by health policy absolutism, or by a
willingness to pursue those ends despite acknowledgment of the some-
times wrenching tradeoffs?
Perhaps these judges, facing too many disparate values, yearn for
absolutes that would help them maintain their self-understood role as
"integrating" the law. It is true that health care exists at the intersection
of a number of practices-medical, scientific, actuarial, caregiving-all
of which are tangent to an otherwise closed, internal, and pedigreed set
of legal rules. Does health law alone exhibit this normative overload?
This pluralism and interplay of norms and practices surely characterizes
other topical areas as well.
As a future line of inquiry, we might look for this phenomenon in
non-health cases and test our expectation that adjudication would simi-
larly buckle under the strain of handling the concurrency of norms. We
359. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 450-51 (1971).
360. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 79.
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would hypothesize the same desperate anxiety to restore the unitary, co-
herent "principle" that integrates the entire field.
One reading of these cases, or one candidate for a unifying princi-
ple, ignoring for the moment all the contrary case law, might be that
health has a privileged justificatory weight. What if the implicit view that
judges harbor is that health needs should prevail, that health values exert
some resistance before they yield to another competing policy? What if
the coherent principle that banishes the non-health values from the scene
is an incipient canon privileging health, establishing what we can fairly
call a "right to health?"61
What if a critical mass of courts is compelled by the internal logic
of fairness specific to health, which I stipulate as follows: a principle that
if calamity befalls a member of our community, threatening life and
limb, or other existential preconditions (like pregnancy), and it is within
the human arts to help, we resist limitations.362 Perhaps we do not accept
that health care needs can be weighed like any other policy. Perhaps they
are in Dworkin's language, matters of principle, because the extension of
health care in the face of mortality and suffering acknowledges of the
individual dignity and worth of each individual.
Health interests in this regard should not differ with age, nor cede
lightly to assertions of sexual morality. They obtain for those who buy
their sugary drinks regardless of who vends or inspects the vendors of
those drinks. They do not cleave along adventitious diagnostic distinc-
tions, such as strabismus versus myopia. In White, the judge said as
much: "In our view, the statute does not grant such discretion to the state.
Rather, it requires an equitable distribution of the total funds available
among all in need of the service, with a consequent sharing of benefit
and hardship."3 63
The logic of fairness in law shies away from substantive standards
of reasonableness and looks at whether the decision has authority, re-
gardless of the content.36 But perhaps substantive reasonability can be
361. Such as Sunstein's non-delegation canons. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1668, 1683-84.
Here, I am borrowing heavily from other scholars who have discussed such a canon, but primarily
insofar as they lament the absence of one. See, e.g., WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC
HEALTH, AND THE LAW 267-68 (2009) (presenting a comprehensive argument for why there should
be such a health norm throughout law-"salus populi suprema lex"-and what it might look like);
see also Richard A. Daynard, Regulating Tobacco: The Need for a Public Health Judicial Decision-
Making Canon, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 281, 282 (2002).
362. As Mark Hall says, "the existential stakes" of death, disability, and one's personhood
hang in the balance. Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist
View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 347, 358 (2006).
363. White II, 555 F.2d at 1150.
364. Waldron says this is key to Raz' positivism. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT 37 (1999) ("Authority cannot exist, according to Raz, and legal authority (in what-
ever shape or form) cannot do its work, unless there is a basis for recognizing pronouncements as
authoritative which stands apart from the content and merits of the issues that the authority address-
es." (citing JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 203 (1994))).
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supplied by health norms-norms of what we are owed and owe one
another in the face of suffering, vulnerability, and mortality.365 Health
care holds out a promise of acknowledgement under those circumstances,
in the form of help and care, at the level of what arts and sciences our
society has accumulated by its best efforts.
The more familiar logic of substantive rationality review prohibits
judges from picking and choosing among competing norms, ranking and
balancing them as the judges see fit. Instead, courts claim to engage in a
means-ends fit analysis. But when multiple purposes are present, other
observers have argued trenchantly and persuasively that a judge actually
reach his or her result by manipulating the purpose, restricting permissi-
ble ends to the unitary one that the judge has selected.3 66 Thus, the courts
in performing the subconstitutional forms of substantive review we have
examined here are also engaged in presumptively privileging certain
purposes and declaring others less weighty as against their favored val-
ues. To the extent that judges are doing so here, they may be implicitly
asserting a background health right-a privileged purpose, heretofore
unacknowledged.367
Consistent with Dworkin:
[W]e might, for simplicity, stipulate not to call any political aim a
right unless it has a certain threshold weight against collective goals
in general; unless, for example, it cannot be defeated by appeal to any
of the ordinary routine goals of political administration, but only by a
goal of special urgency.
And indeed, these cases might be understood to illustrate exactly
such an attitude toward health, an attitude recognizing health as a pre-
sumptive right. Of course, Dworkin does not claim that rights inhering in
background principles would override legal rules, but the courts could be
viewed as acting as though these hypothesized health rights inhere in the
separation of powers rules, and the arbitrary and capricious standard, and
the crosscutting statutory requirement of "reasonableness." While none
of these cases strike a federal statute compromising health values,36 9 we
365. This conception is broad enough that it is conceivably consistent with any one of the
Health Promotion, Financial Security or Brute Luck conceptions of the purposes of health insurance
articulated in Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models ofHealth Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (2011).
366. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 127.
367. 1 draw from Dworkin to show the work that judges are performing to construct purpose,
but this maneuver is also manifestly rooted in the Legal Process school, an important antecedent for
Dworkin. Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart &
Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 470-71 (1987) (drawing the connections between legal process theory
and Dworkin's law as integrity).
368. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 92.
369. Though the Eleventh Circuit, in the case that was appealed and would later become Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2011), did seek to declare
Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause invalid with respect to the mandate pre-
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might still understand this privileged weight as a canon, much like Sun-
stein's nondelegation canons protecting special values such as federal-
ism, or the common-law substantive canons Abbe Gluck has identified,
privileging policies from taxation to international law norms.37 But ra-
ther than default canons allowing cost-benefit analysis, we might posit
instead a default canon resisting cost-benefit balancing in health care
cases.371
I would be remiss if I implied by this view that recognizing a right
to health would quell normative conflict over substance. First, the ques-
tion of how much weight such a privilege exerts would move to the fore-
ground.372 Second, it is ironic that this health absolutist tendency is often
used, as it was in the NYC soda portion cap case, to strike innovative,
incremental measures to improve health.
Finally, under a "right to health," normative contest would relocate
to the question of what belongs in the bundle that constitutes the "right."
One final commonality these three cases all share is a demonstration that
there is no underlying a priori concept called health, whose boundaries
are self-evident. Health is what we construct, and it lies on a continuum.
All of these cases founder on their attempts to represent health as some
static identifiable principle. Judge Renwick hews to the notion that expo-
sures are either a health hazard or not, but in the realm of food, nutrition,
and obesity the questions are ones of extent. Dose-response curves need
not be disjoint; some are U-shaped, and some are continuous without
inflection points.373 Meanwhile, what Judge Korman glosses over is that
drug indications can be broader or narrower, and the prevailing paradigm
denies that there should be any underlying "natural" category constrain-
ing what the drug sponsor posits.3 74 And Judge Weis in White runs up
against the malleability of the definition of benefits and the case law
permitting states to trim benefits in myriad other ways.375
But that is a topic for another day. Even bracketing such complica-
tions, the task of evaluating my alternate explanation, that a right or priv-
cisely because the mandate contained exceptions for low-income individuals. Florida ex rel. Att'y.
Gen. v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1310-11 (2011).
370. Gluck, supra note 17, at 765-66.
371. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1692-94 (describing nondelegation canons requiring Congress
to state unambiguously if it wishes a statute to be interpreted to apply extraterritorially, or to raise
constitutional questions, or to implicate certain federalism concerns, etc.).
372. John F. Manning, Lessons From a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1541,
1562-65 (2008).
373. See Lawrence Alexander, Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments 7-9 (Univ. of San Diego
Law Sch., Research Paper No. 07-19, 2005) (discussing how many matter subject o legal determina-
tion have this aspect of scaling according to degree, while legal determination may require the draw-
ing of a binary line along the scale).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 138-59, 181-84.
375. See, e.g., Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992); Curtis v. Taylor, 625
F.2d 645, 653 (5th Cir. 1980); Charleston Mem'1 Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 332-33 (4th Cir.
1982); Va. Hosp. Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781, 786 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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ilege for health might drive these cases, is somewhat outside the bounds
of this piece. Perhaps one could compare this exceptions phenomenon in
health-related cases to exceptions-based invalidations in other topical
areas, and measure, if one could, whether the invalidations were more
idiosyncratic in fields constituted by "interests" rather than "rights."
If one were to find the phenomenon sounding in other non-rights
arenas, one might conclude that the condemnation of underreach in these
cases has less to do with judicial concern for health and instead justifies a
generalization of my proposed explanation: that this exceptions phenom-
enon is a late-mannerist expression of the style of adjudication along the
model of Hercules, an elision of rule and principle that emerges as a
function of regarding background policies as part of the law and as a
direct consequence of the imperative to impose coherence over plural-
ism.

